132 The Warrior Tsar, 1689-1725
Swedish peasant. This was partiy because of Russia's social and institutional
backwardness, and partly because the Swedish system was not applied con-
sistently: in particular, Russia was just now moving away from the household
tax, which was intrinsically more equitable, to the cruder but more profitable
poll tax.
The reason for the change was that the government wanted to increase its
revenue in order to maintain the troops properly. The underlying principle was
the same as before and breath-takingly simple: to divide total military expen-
diture by the number of male taxpayers ('souls') and thus arrive at a uniform
assessment for the whole country: so many kopecks per individual. Initially
Peter held out the prospect that this new tax would replace all other state
obligations, but this did not happen; there was a certain rationalization of
these dues, but the total fiscal burden was much heavier than it had been in
Muscovite times-over twice as great, in the estimation of contemporaries.^58
This is a contentious point, and we shall attempt to substantiate our view
below in the context of the state budget. Let us first see what happened in prac-
tice 'on the ground'. In November 1718 the tsar issued a laconically-worded
decree calling for submission within one year of returns (skazk1) stating the
number of 'souls of the male sex' in each community; on this basis a calculation
was to be made as to how many souls would be needed to support a private
soldier, allowing for overheads such as regimental and company staffs.^59 Peter
greatly underestimated the complexity of this operation. In the first place,
those responsible for this third census ran into the same-problem1 as their
predecessors: massive concealment of potential taxpayers and lack of admin-
istrative staff to detect and deal with defaulters. By the end of 1719 the
brigadier in charge of the census, V. N. Zotov, had received only a few
statements, and these were inaccurate.
The next step was to send out guards officers with orders to put dilatory
officials in irons and to confiscate their property. Governors were instructed to
check the data personally and were provided with posses of troops to vet
suspect landowners; the deadline had to be extended.^60 The postponement was
in part due to the government's decision to include all the nobles' dependants,
not just their peasants-a far-reaching change whose precise motives are
unclear. Possibly the authorities realized that unless this were done the burden
on the farming population would be too great, for a pilot project to quarter
two regiments in Novgorod province showed that the per capita rate of poll tax
would be as high as 97 kopecks.^61 The data on military costs were also found to
need revision.^62
58 Manstein, 'Zapiski', p. 296; Klyuchevsky, Soch., vii. 329; cf. p. 156.(^59) PSZ v. 3245 (26 Nov. 1718); Klyuchevsky, Soch., vii. 319; Milyukov, Gos. khoz. Rossii,
p. 636; Bogoslovsky, Obi. reforma, p. 326.
60 PSZ v. 3460 (4 Dec. 1719), 3492 (19 Jan. 1720); vi. 3762 (15 Mar. 1721), 3782 (I I May 1721);
Milyukov, Gos. khoz. Rossii, p. 638; Bogoslovsky, Obi. reforma, p. 327.
61 Klyuchevsky, Soch., vii. 322, 325 (95 kopecks: figure corrected following PSZ vi. 3753 (5
.1ar. 1721); cf. PSZ vi. 3720 (27 Jan. 1721)); Bogoslovsky, Obi. reforma, pp. 355-60.
62 PSZ vii. 4229 (20 May 1723); Klyuchevsky, Soch., vii. 324.