16 Muscovite Roots, 1462-
1'
l\lahmet-girey crossed the river Oka (which formed the boundary), 'laid waste
the country terribly' and came within reach or Moscow; the Grand Prince fled
and allegedly hid under a haystack; 'gifts' (that is, tribute) were handed over,
whereupon the khan withdrew with 'an incredible numhf'r of prisoners', some
of whom were massacred shortly afterwards. 'For the elderly and sick, who do
not fetch much [on the slave market] and are unfit for work, are given by the
Tatars to their young men, much as one gives a hare to a hound to make it
snappish: they are stoned lo death or thrown into the sea ... '.'°Several tens of
thousands of warriors might take part in a major raid. The Tatars were aided
by their robust physique and superb horsemanship, strong clan affinities,
knowledge of the local terrain, and skilful use of ruses de guerre. They often
managed to take their slow-moving foes by surprise. They were inferior,
however, in 'modern' equipment (firearms, artillery), a factor that explains
why they seldom persisted with sieges or towns or fortified places.^11 All in all,
they posed a formidable threat. The history of this epic conflict can scarcely be
written, given the scantiness of the sources. The vulnerability of Russia's
borders in this era scarred men's minds and left lasting traces.
The Russians responded by developing an alert system based on fixed
defence lines and a mobile reserve, which will be considered further below.
Manning ii was the raison d'etre of the gentry cavalry, although the bulk of the
troops involved were of humbler origin. Particularly important was the role of
Cossacks and other border peoples (for example, sevryuki) with a similar life-
,1yle, who acted as scouts and harassed the invaders from the flank as they
withdrew. They showed more initiative and combativeness than the privileged
-;ervitors, not least because they had a direct interest in protecting their homes
,rnd families.^12 The defence system seems to have originated spontaneously as
,1 local enterprise, to which the central authorities soon supplied direction. The
lirst fortified line, of simple palisades and earthworks which took advantage
if the natural obstacles, ran along the rivers Oka and Ugra. In the 1530s it was
pushed forward as far as Tula, and after Ivan !V's conquest of the Kazan·
l\hanate in 1552 another line was built along the Volga against the Nogays (see
.nap I ).^13 The reserve forces were concentrated at Kaluga or Serpukhov,
.vhence they could be sent to the most vulnerable sector. How far did these
neasures, and the control from the centre they implied, help or hinder the people
in the spot? Most of them probably welcomed the additional protection but
csented the obligation lo build, maintain, and garrison the forts, especially
~·here high-ranking superiors seemed to be concerned less with providing
·ffective leadership than with furthering their own careers.
(^111) Von lkrhl'r,lein, /111J1cmw, pp. 16J-R.
(^11) On Talar 1ar1ir' •cc l\aqialov, Na .Hepnoy 11.rani/Je, pp. 12-IR; !here is a lively accounl in
lr1rher, Rtl.\<e C11111111111111·1•alth, pp. 1'11-202 (Schmid! cdn .• pp. 90-IUJ).
12 Kargalo\', Na .Hepnoy va1111<1•. p. 74; id .• 'Oborona', p. 146.
11 Kar~alo", 'Ohorona ', p. 147; id., Na stepflny f(ranitse, pp. 80, IOI; 11elyayev, 0 storozlre1·oy
.. ,/11<./Jbe, p. 5.