Moscow's Men on Horseback^19after M. I. Vorotynsky, a leading commander who twice fell into the tsar's
disfavour, had undertaken, in consultation with experienced representatives
from the area, a thorough-going review of the border defence arrangements.^16
The statute issued after chis cu11f1::n:m.:1:: ii~it:J i11 Jdctii ii11:: vc:u iuu~ ~1::du1:. uf
the front, from the Polish-Lithuanian border to the Don, with their respective
forts and guard towers, and laid down how the watchmen and patrols were to
carry out their tasks. Each station (stanitsa) was to be under a chief (go/ova),
who in turn was responsible to the field commander ( voyevoda, voivode). The
latter reported to the principal military chancellery in Moscow, the Razryad
(see below, p. 35). This body, not the local commander, was to issue assign-
ments to the servitors in each town-a characteristic example of creeping
bureaucratic centralism that could not but stifle the initiative of men in the
field. During the last quarter of the sixteenth century the arrival of settlers
pushed the border further southwards into the steppe and several new fortified
towns were established (for example, Voronezh 1585, Yelets 1592, Belgorod
1595).^17 An order of^1577 setting up an additional agency of supervisors
(dozorshchiki) to combat absenteeism^18 suggests that morale was not all it
might have been. In fact Moscow's hold on the region at this time was still
tenuous. In I 598 the Ryurikid dynasty expired and shortly thereafter public
order collapsed. It was the restless southern borderlands that furnished most of
the thousands of malcontents who joined the various popular militias that
were formed. Comprising Cossacks and other lower-grade servitors, non-
Slavic tribesmen, fugitive peasants, and slaves, these makeshift armies waged
one campaign after another, under the banner of false pretenders to the throne
or simple bandit chieftains, with the object of avenging themselves on their
former masters and refashioning the social hierarchy to suit their sectional
interests. Foreign powers joined in the fray and Russia plunged into chaos.
The conventional term for this period (1598-1613), 'the Time of Troubles',
scarcely does justice to the horrors that befell ordinary folk. Millions fell victim
to famine and disease.
When the country began to recover after the accession of Tsar Michael
Romanov (1613-45) the political and military establishment was reconstituted
much as it had been before. The weakness of the new dynasty and the general
misery forced Russia's leaders to adopt a cautious foreign policy. However,
Patriarch Filaret, who managed affairs f~om^1619 to 1633, was eager for war
with Poland-Lithuania. His immediate aim was to recover the key fortress of
Smolensk, lost in 1612. The Smolensk War of 1632-4, limited in scope, dem-
onstrated once again the Moscow government's difficulties in co-ordinating
policies on two exposed flanks; for while Russian troops were investing the city
'·
16 AMG i. 1-2 (also in Beskrovnyy, Khrestomatiya, pp. 64-R); Zagorodsky, Belgorodskaya
cherta, p. 56; Belyayev, 0 storozhevoy ... s/uzhbe, pp. 11-17. On Yorotynsky see also Kleimola,
'Mil. Service', p. 53, and 'Changing Face', p. 488.
(^17) Belyayev, 0 storozhevoy ... s/11zhbe, pp. 22, 31, J3.
(^18) Ibid .• p. 24.