208 The Imperial Century, 1725-1825German officer who, a few years earlier, claimed that Russian soldiers were
naturally servile, lacked all ambition, and were incapable of acting unless they
v•ere closely controlled by their superiors.^32
Curiously 'conservative' views of this kind were echoed by radicals towards
the end of the century. The anonymous 'Ami de Ia verite' cited above spoke of
'the puerile and rigid subordination' which he had occasion to observe 'hun-
dreds of times' in Russia.^33 Masson believed that acts of courage by soldiers on
the battlefield were due mainly to the threat of punishment: 'he fears his
officer's cane more than the enemy's cannon; one might say that his cowardice
makes him brave'.^34 De Raymond was only slightly more perspicacious in
noting that 'Russian troops have a passive courage, a military resignation
rather than those elans de bravoure inspired by love of glory,'^35 and showed
himself to be a poor prophet when he added that 'they are incapable of those
supernatural efforts which have so often attended our arms'-this was written
just before Napoleon crossed the Niemen! ~
In fact Russian soldiers were as capable as those in other armies of the age of
launching death-defying assaults on enemy positions, especially if they were
led by popular and efficient commanders.^36 On the other hand their stoicism
and stubbornness did show themselves to best effect in defence. It is reason-
able to link this quality to the men's cultural and social background as Ortho-
dox peasants and to Russia's lack of a chivalrous feudal tradition. These traits
are exemplified by the conduct of Private Gavrilo Sidorov, herq of the 17th
Chasseurs. During the fighting in the Caucasus (1805) he suggested a scheme
for transporting artillery across a ditch by means of a makeshift bridge of
rifles held up by a dozen broad-shouldered soldiers. The first gun crossed suc-
cessfully but the second slipped, crushing the unfortunate Gavrilo.37 It would
be superfluous to enumerate, in the manner of regimental historians or of
patriots like Glinka, other such podvigi; but it is worth noting how many
military memorialists, perhaps unconsciously, tended to pick out instances of
what de Raymond called 'passive courage'. Ataman Denisov records two occa-
sions, in 1794 and 1799 respectively, when troops he commanded 'held their
place' or 'stood without a word' as their comrades fell beside them.^38 Lieuten-
ant Antonovsky extolled the feat of a grenadier who, wounded in the retreat
from Smolensk and receiving no medical attention, cut off his own gangrenous
arm with his sword and marched on with his unit lest he be left behind among
strangers.^39 I. Engel', a hussar cornet who fought at Leipzig, tells a similar
32 [Schwan(?)], Merkwurdigkeiten, p. 116.
33 Ami de la Verile, Coup d'ceil, pp. 87-9, 99.
34 Masson, Memoires, ii. 63; cf. Guttin (MAE, Met D, Russie 32 (1800-13), f. 1) who in 1800
allowed also for the promise of material rewards, especially of alcohol.
35 De Raymond, Tableau, p. viii.
36 Cf. for example Bogdanovich, Russkaya armiya, p. 26 (Ochakov); Liprandi, in Kharkevich,
1812 god, ii. 10 (Smolensk); Yermolov, Zapiski, p. 83.
37 Bobrovsky, Istoriya 13-go ... polka, pp. 149-50.
38 Denisov, 'Zapiski', 10, p. 383, 12, p. 33.
39 Antonovsky, 'Zapiski', p. 125.