Birth of the Military Intelligentsia 245
Alexander I could be interpreted as heralding a new age of righteousness, or
why ymmg officers caught up in the new mood should condemn abuses within
the army that had hitherto been taken for granted, such as building up a private
fortune at the expense of one's men or subjecting them to gross physical cruelty.
Corruption seems to have reached a peak in the last years of Catherine's reign,
when a regimental commander could expect to make a profit of several
thousands of roubles a year.^76 Physical violence was probably most widespread
later, during the so-called Arakcheyev regime (ca. 1815-25), which will be
discussed in ch. 12.
The reign of Paul exemplified many of the evils which the military intelli-
gentsia would try to combat. Like his father, the emperor was a fervent admirer
of Frederick the Great, but in seeking to emulate him succeeded in adopting
only the externals of his by now somewhat tarnished military system. While
still tsarevich, Paul set up a 2,400-strong elite force on his estate at Gatchina.
Prussian methods of instruction were employed and many of the officers were
of German stock. There was a striking parallel here not only with Peter Ill's
Holsteiners but also with the young Peter I's private army over a century
earlier. No sooner had Catherine died than these 'Gatchina men' (Gatchintsy)
were brought to the capital, handsomely rewarded (for no apparent merit),
and enrolled in the guards. Ostensibly, their task was to train their officer
comrades in the intricacies of Prussian drill and tactics, so that they in turn
might be sent out to instruct the line regiments. The revised army regulations
which Paul lost no time in promulgating-predictably modelled on those of
Frederick-were to be enforced throughout the Russian army. The brusque,
tactless way in which these changes were effected caused a great deal of
offence, as did the emperOr·'s insistence that all officers on the active list, how-
ever senior in rank or feeble in health, should demonstrate proficiency in the
new parade-ground skills to his own satisfaction.
The underlying purpose of all this was to assert the monarch's personal con-
trol over the armed forces by tightening discipline and enforcing strict hierar-
chical subordination. Paul doubted the loyalty of officers or functionaries
who had enjoyed Imperial favour under the previous administration, and
especially the military bureaucrats entrenched in the General Staff and War
College. The former was dissolved and replaced by another, less effective,
body; the War College survived, but with diminished powers. Instead the
emperor relied heavily upon the inspectors. They were strengthened, notably
by an infusion of Gatchintsy, and sent out to review the divisions in the field.
They also supervised the regimental 'chiefs' (shefy), who were another Pauline
innovation.^77 These officers, who held general's rank, were conceived as inter-
mediaries between the autocrat and the units they nominally commanded,
76 See Tuchkov, Zapiski, p. 9, Langeron, 'Russkaya anniya', 4, pp. 160-1, and sourcescited in
Keep, 'Pistol', pp. 313-14.
11 PSZ xxiv. 17720 (9 Jan. 1797), xxv. 18470, 18725 (8 Apr., 31 Oct. 1798).