(^248) Gentlemen to Officers
substance to this view-the ageing field-marshal did not hide his contempt for
the new army regulations and was soon banished to his estate-but his par-
tisans, who needed an inspiratiuuai figure as ieader, absolutized th~ difference
between him and his critics. In so doing they helped to build up a Rtyth which
has exercised a lasting influence on Russian military historiography' and has
only recently been called in question.^89 Involuntarily Suvorov became~ focus
for disaffected officers, eighteen of whom, on resigning their commiss'ions,
accompanied the fallen field-marshal to his estate, where they were later
arrested as a security risk.^90 Colonel Kakhovsky, who had served on Suvorov's
staff, is said to have urged him to effect a coup, a suggestion which he
reportedly turned down out of humanitarian considerations. The story is un-
corroborated91 and does not ring true.
Instead Suvorov took the course followed by many of his fellow officers of
lower rank: recalled to active duty in 1799, he gladly left the oppressive atmos-
phere of his homeland for the battlefields of central Europe, where he could
expect to win further laurels. His exploits in the campaign of 1799-1800-the
Adda, Novi, and the epic crossing of the Alps-raised his prestige to even
greater heights, but on his return, physically ailing, he was in no position to
lead the dissidents even had he wanted to. Their nationalistic spirit was rein-
forced by the disappointing performance of Russia's Austrian ally during the
campaign, and by Paul's astonishing turn towards an accommodation with
Bonaparte.^92
The general malaise found expression in the formation of a new con-
spiratorial network. Unlike its predecessor, this drew its support primarily
from guards officers stationed in St. Petersburg and was headed by several
highly-placed dignitaries. They included N. P. Panin, who held major-
general's rank but was a civilian (and diplomat), and above all General P. A.
von der Pahlen (Palen), who as military governor of St. Petersburg had charge
of security matters in the capital. According to N. A. Sablukov, a colonel in
the Horse Guards loyal to Paul, 188 persons were privy to the plot (in its
second phase).^93 Sixty-eight individuals have been positively identified: 50 of
them were in the armed forces, all but six in the guards.^94 The majority-34 of
the 61 whose age is known-were young men in their 'teens or twenties; at least
20 are thought to have harboured some personal grudge against the tsar.
89 Duffy, Russia's Military Way, p. 234, notes jus1ly tha1 both Suvorov and his predecessor
Mtinnich were 'creative members of the cosmopolitan European military community'.
90 RBS xx. 59.
91 It origina1ed with Yermolov, whose memoir has yel to be published in full: Snytko, 'Novye
materialy', p. 112.
92 For a recent analysis of this policy switch which demonstrates its rationality, see
- Feldbaek, 'The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I, 1800-1: an In1erpretation', JGOE 30 (1982).
pp. 16-36.
93 'Zapiski', p. 87; cf. [Bartenev) 'Graf Panin', p. 409.
94 Kenney, 'Politics of Assassination', pp. 128-31; cf. also Zubow, Paul/, pp. 314-IS. For an
early list: M. A. Fon-Vizin, 'Obozreniye proyavleniy politicheskoy zhizni v Rossii' (183S), in
Scmevsky et al., Obsh,·hestvenniya dvizheniya, i. 133.