The Praetorian Opt ion 271use Perlmutter's terminology for different types of Praetorian rule. This need
not have mattered much if the principal conspirators had been agreed on tac-
tics, but this was not the case. The idea of sei1ing power was not firmly
established in their minds, although they probably had sufficient physical
mean~ tc take :h:s cruc;u1 :.tcp-if ttvt to hold unto JilJwc1u11.:~1ht:y had seized it.
Their indecisiveness may best be explained in terms of the Russian political
culture, shaped as this was by the idea of patrimonial and paternalistic mon-
archy. Even those who were prepared to commit regicide were probably
monarchists at heart, for all their professed republicanism. They sought to
manipulate the tsardom, as the symbol of national unity, and to influence its
policies in a direction that would cater to the military interest, which they iden-
tified with the general weal. The readiness with which a number of activists
first approached Alexander I with their reform proposals and then confessed
their errors to his successor in the hope of receiving a royal pardon suggests
that the myth of autocratic benevolence was slill strong among these officers.
just as it was among the populace at large-although in the case of their con-
fessions we have to make allowance for the severe psychological strain induced
by defeat, arrest, and detention in harsh physical conditions.
The historical literature on the 'Decembrists' implies that, had they trium-
phed, Russia would have entered upon a radiant future of indefinite duration.
It is perhaps not superfluous to suggest that a Praetorian victory in 1825 might
have had very different results. On one side of the speculative equation the
revolutionaries would have benefited from such factors as the army's historic-
ally predominant role and high prestige in society, the weakness of civilian
government institutions, the fragmentation of opinion within the elite, and the
low level of political awareness among the masses. On the other hand, even if
they had secured the co-operation of a royal figure-head, their new order
would surely have evoked considerable resistance from traditionalists in all
classes; nor would the empire's national minorities have taken kindly to
Pester 's plans for a unitary state. Could the military have pushed through
their reform programme, and preserved their cohesion, in the face of admin-
istrative obstruction and popular opposition?
The example of Spain is instructive. Don Rafael del Riego's successful rising
in 1820 (which greatly impressed Russian liberals)R^9 led to civil war and foreign
intervention, and was followed by a restoration of absolutism. Geography and
Realpolitik might have spared Russia another foreign invasion, but she could
scarcely have escaped the other consequences. Successful Praetorian coups
generally lead in the long run only to a limited injection of fresh blood into the
elite. But here speculation should cease.
MQ'De Madariaga, 'Spain and the Decembri\ls·. p. 14~; d. i\1. V. Nechkina, 'Dekabris1y vo
vsemirno.-istoricheskom prol\esse'. VI. 197~. 12. pp. -~-18 !l·ng. Ir.: Srudiesin Sol'ier History I~
(While Plains, NY, 1977), pp. 32-62).