probably appreciated the improved sanitation: farm animals, for instance,
were kept in separate sheds. On the ocher hand, their living quarters were very
~·ramped: an area of 9 by 16 sa:.hens (66 square mecres) had to be shared by
four families oi farmers and their lodgers. Each pair of families pooled their
household resources-an interesting adaptation of che arrel principle.^59 The
'errlers had to build their homes themselves (perhaps with the aid of a military
labour battalion), as well as workshops, guardhouses, exercise-halls, adminis-
trative offices, and so on-not to mention houses for senior NCOs (who were
noc allotted homesteads) and officers. All'this imposed a heavy burden.
Still more onerous was the construction· work that had to be done to
improve communications (roads, canals) and to facilitate the agricultural and
other economic activities which each unit carried on. The Russian soldier was
certainly no stranger to physical labour, but in the settlements there was far
more of it than usual and he received precious little reward. The normal wage
was 25 kopecks a day, half the usual rate at the time for hired civilian workers,
and from this trivial sum a portion was deducted for food. Often, it seems, the
men received no more than a ration while their pay went straight into the artel
fund, or even into chat of the settlement, on the specious grounds that this
capital existed for the soldiers' own benefit. Labourers who were remunerated
on a piecework basis had to meet high norms. In Novgorod in 1826 each man
was expected to dig a trench 15 sazhens (32 metres) long in one day.^60 The
officials who fixed these targets were under pressure from above to provide
quick results and knew that no questions would be asked if they ignored
regulations. The administration took the view that military labour was a
valuable but under-exploited resource. 'Soldiers could do amazing things for
che state's benefit', wrote V. P. Kochubey to Arakcheyev, 'so long as they are
kept under reasonable and effective surveillance and work according to a well
thought-out plan. '^61 He was convinced that in the Novgorod settlements,
which he had just visited, this was indeed the case.
!\lost of the work was of course agricultural. The farms were expected not
only to meet the army's own requirements but also to yield a surplus for sale.
Civilian output levels were to be exceeded by enlarging the sown area,
improving techniques, and developing communications. In so far as these
plans were designed to encourage a spirit of initiative among the settlers, they
were quite sensible; but nowhere were they set down coherently, and narrow
limits were set to free enterprise in practice. When some farmers suggested set-
ting up an industrial plant the idea was turned down as premature.^62 Produce
'^9 Bois-le-Comte to La Ferronays, 24 July 1821, MAE, Met D, Russie 27 (1819-27), f. 41;
Lykoshin, 'Voyennye poseleniya', pp. 93-4; Petrov, 'Ustroystvo', pp. 154-6; Yevstafyev,
Voss:aniye, pp. 70-1.(^60) Petrov, 'Ustroystvo', pp. 116, 121-3, 203; Yevstafyev, Vossraniye, p. 66, Kartsov, 'O
voyennykh poseleniyakh', 3, p. 107, claims that on construction projects soldiers' food was better
than usual, but offers no evidence that this was so.
~1 Kartsov, •o voyennykh poseleniyakh ', 3, p. 87.
6~ Ibid., p. 112.