(^324) Towards a Modern Army, 1825-1874
1chieve the desired exemplary etlect.^4 The tsar·~ obsession with outward show,
iierarchical subordination, and mechanical compliance with commands came
o be emulated by many of his officers. It led them to neglect more substantial
natters likely to affect the army's performance in the field. Manoeuvres
·emained formal affairs at which little attempt was made to simulate battle-
·ield conditions. The troops were seldom given instruction in marhmanship,
·or commanders set little store by firepower, rrcferring the cold steel of the
)ayonet. There were some grounds for their attitude, since the smooth-bored
nuzzle-loaders issued to Russian infantrymen were of little use in action; but
)ther European armies of the day were introducing guns with rifled barrels
hat had much greater accuracy and range. The same was true, mutatis mu/an-
tis, of the artillery. The Russian military authorities were slow to adjust to
hese technical innovations, just as they were to the tactical changes associated
Nith them,^5 although their efficacity had already been demonstrated during
he campaigns against Napoleon.
Yet Nicholas's army had ample opportunity to acquire combat experience.
~uccessful wars with Persia (1826-8) and Turkey (1828-9) brought the empire
tdded power and prestige. The Caucasian tribes proved harder to conquer
han St. Petersburg expected. Fired by religious zeal and ethnic loyalties, the
:hechen, lngush, and other peoples of the region made the most of their
~xcellent defensive positions. They offered fierce resistance to the Russian
:roops who made their way up the narrow valleys, taking hostages and burning
villages or crops as they advanced. The long drawn-out Caucasian War was
:xpensive in blood and treasure. It tied down large bodies of men at a time
when the regime faced a greater threat from the rising tide of nationalism in
:entral Europe. The insurrection which broke out in Warsaw in November
1830 was followed by several months of fighting between regular troops and
bands of guerillas, who won a fair measure of popular support in the empire's
western provinces as well as in ethnil:ally Polish territory. The European
revolutions of 1848 prompted the tsar to declare a state of emergency and to
2all up more troops, although he already had more men under arms, poised to
strike, than any other ruler. In the following year Nicholas intervened to help
the Habsburgs put down the rebellious Hungarians. The campaign brought
Russia little glory and led indirectly to the materialization four years later of a
much greater threat. Britain and France, alarmed at what they took to be
expansionist moves against Turkey, drifted into war on the latter's behalf.
Austria seemed likely to join the allies. Wisely, the Russian government decided
to withdraw the troops it had sent into the Danubian principalities, but then
unexpectedly found itself facing an allied expeditionary force on its own soil,
in the Crimean peninsula. The 'Eastern War', as the Russians called it, strained
the empire's resources so severely as to rule out the prospect of victory. The
4 Sokolovsky, 'Ru\kaya gvarJ1ya', pp. 44-5.
5 For details sec no" Be.>krovnyy, Putt'11t.1ial, pp. 102-16.
wang
(Wang)
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