Moscow's Men on Horseback 31
its inner workings, such as the electoral act; but this rule, as one might expect,
was difficult to define and even harder to observe in practice. All too often
local initiative was closely circumscribed. More concretely, what usually seems
to have transpired was that the voivode, as the representative of the central
authority, reached an informal arrangement with the 'better'-that is, senior
in rank, wealthier, and more privileged-elements of the local gentry com-
munity. Such collusion could be vindicated as essential for the smooth opera-
tion of the system; yet it was likely to offend the poorer and disadvantaged deti
boyarskiye and to make them feel that they were being exploited by their
fellows. All servitors were bound by a network of sureties (poruki)^62 whereby
the signatories-kinsmen, neighbours, or comrades-pledged themselves to
answer for those who misbehaved or stepped out of line. This was a powerful
instrument of social control which reinforced outward conformity of thought
and action. In practice, however, the cohesion of each organization was under
constant strain.
In Muscovy the election of any official (for example, for revenue collection
or as judicial assessors) had the character of a duty rather than a right. So it
was also with the compensation entitlement officials (okladchiki), whose job it
was to evaluate the service which each of their fellows had rendered, or were
expected to render, and on that basis to place them in a particular category in
regard to rewards. (These rewards, in cash and land, will be discussed in ch. 2.)
It was only natural that the individuals chosen for such a responsible and
delicate task should themselves be men in the most senior category-not least
because, in principle at any rate, they had to be able to reimburse the state for
any losses incurred by their error or malfeasance. In practice, as data for the
late sixteenth century show, they had more personal servants (slaves)-and
probably also more land-than any other category of provincial servitor.^63
This marked them out as local leaders, and as logical allies of the voivode,
both in fulfilling the authorities' legitimate behests and in sharing the pickings:
for instance, at Yelets in the 1630s the voivode colluded with one Dmitriy Snetin
who used a false-bottomed bucket when issuing grain allocations to his com-
rades. 64
Those who objected to such practices could complain-that is, submit a
petition-cum-denunciation-but the central authorities were notoriously tardy
in investigating such complaints, especially if they stemmed from the relatively
junior ranks. True, the central military chancellery, the Razryad, sent out
officials to the provinces to assist in mustering, inspecting, and awarding com-
pensation. In the seventeenth century they operated in permanence from the
voivode's office. These senior functionaries' opinions normally carried a good
deal of weight. However, they could not easily verify the information submitted
(^62) Shakhmatov, Kompetentsiya, pp. 176-8; Kleimola, 'Up Through Servitude', pp. 217-18,
221-2; for the beginnings of this system in the 1520s: Rilss, Adel, pp. 78-84.
(^61) Hellie, 'Muse. Prov. Elite', p. BA.
(^64) Chistyakova, 'Volneniya', pp. 258-9.