364 Towards a Modern Army, 1825-1874
which is much better known. Its vigour was partly due to the fact that Russia
had been defeated in the field; another factor was the greater role played by
Poles, Ukrainians, and others who either had or were acquiring a conscious-
ness of their national identity. The conspirators also benefited,'from the
presence of emigre leaders who commanded considerable moral authority:
Herzen's Kolokol in particular was able to serve as a practical co-ordii\ating
centre as well as a publishing outlet for locally produced material. Socially~ the
movement lacked the aristocratic flavour that had characterized 'Decembrism',
at least _in the north. Most activists were from the lower provincial gentry and
held subaltern rank. They made up for their relatively limited experience of
active service by their common schooling in the military college network which
Nicholas I had built up in the interim. The men of this generation were more
professional in outlook and also had closer ties with like-minded civilians.
Finally, they were more familiar with the social theories of the day, even
though their understanding of them might be superficial-as was to be
expected, given the empire's educational backwardness. This shortcoming may
, have contributed to their failure; but more important was the imbalance of
forces (the insurgents were outnumbered by about '40 to 1) and certain
avoidable mistakes. If there was a 'revolutionary situation' in the tsarist
empire at this time, as Soviet historians insist, it was one that the radicals of
the day, Poles as well as Russians, were in no position to exploit. In the later
1860s and 1870s the opposition movement struck deeper root, but it was carried
forward mainly by civilian intellectuals and the role of the military element
declined.
One effect of the revolutionary ferment that culminated in the 1863 insurrection
was to arouse misgivings among conservatives in the military establishment as
to the wisdom of proceeding with fundamental reforms. Milyutin was com-
pelled to postpone his plans to introduce conscription, since even his decen-
tralization measures ran into heavy weather. So far as men in the ranks were
...-concerned, the main improvements initially came in the areas of justice and
education, which we may examine in turn.
Alexander ll's celebrated dictum, 'May justice and mercy reign in the
courts', could not easily be applied to the armed forces. The principles
underlying the judicial reform of 1864, which was modelled on western Euro-
pean practice, were officially extended to the military domain 'to the extent
compatible with the needs or advantage of the service'. This formula, approved
by the tsar in September 1862, was clearly ambiguous. How could the new laws
'maintain and if possible strengthen military discipline and hierarchical sub-
ordination (chinopochitaniye)' and simultaneously 'secure the person of each
(soldier] from arbitrariness and injustice by his superiors'?^65 This required a
veritable revolution in attitudes, which the reformers at least deserve credit for
6l Bogdanovich, /st. ocherk, iv, 478-9.