organization of depots in advance.^164 Maladministration and corruption in the
rear echelons continued to plague the Imperial Russian army so long as it
existed. The cadet corps encouraged the growth of a caste spirit, most in
evidence among guards officers (although their historic privileges vis-a-vis line
officers were now curtailed). Those at the summit of the hierarchy still did best
materially and enjoyed high prestige in polite society. In 1905 Russia had no
less than 1,673 general officers (145 of them in full rank), and a hostile critic
estimated that their maintenance cost the state 10.8 million roubles a year-
twice that of the medical services.^165
One consequence of these reactionary tendencies was that the social gulf
between officers and men, which Milyutin had tried to bridge, grew wider
again. Every effort was made to insulate the army from civilian influences-not
least because it was often called on to help put down civil disorders. By and
large officers accepted this. One infantry major, describing military life at this
time, compared his regiment to a monastery:
Each community has its own rules and view of life. Each is exclusive and constitutes an
organic entity ... In each one withdraws up to a point from the outside world and
becomes wholly absorbed in one's chosen group, which for the lonely pilgrim on this
earth replaces house, friends, children, and in a way even his beloved wife. A man
inclined towards contemplation chooses a monastery. More active, energetic types make
their home in a regiment.^166
It was not until the revolutionary year 1905 that politics sudden!¥ burst in
upon the cloistered, self-sufficient world of these military professionals. But
the soldiers were less isolated. The vast majority of them now spent only a
brief term (four years from the turn of the century) with the colours before
returning to civilian life, which despite all its manifold hardships at least
spared them the bullying to which they were still exposed in the ranks.^167 The
men's material position remained precarious, with pay still only three to four
roubles per annum until 1905, when it was belatedly increased.^168 In these cir-
cumstances it is not surprising that, in contrast to the situation a hundred years
earlier, 'subversive' influences should have penetrated the Russian army from
the bottom up. When it collapsed in 1917 it was the committees formed at
company or regimental level that were the most revolutionary.^169
- 164 Maksheyev, Voyenno-administrat. ustroystvo, p. 111; id., Snabzheniya: organizatsiya i
takrika ikh na voyne, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 4.
165 N. A. Rubakin, 'Voyennaya byurokratiya v tsifrakh', Russkaya mys/', 1907, I, p. 51.
166 A. von Drygalski, Unsere alten Alliirten. Scenen und Typen aus dem Friedensleben der
russischen Offiziere, Berlin, 1894, p. 197.
167 Corporal punishment for men in the 'punished' category remained on the statute books
until 1904, and in practice was never wholly eliminated. One conservative wanted the number of
permitted strokes to be tripled: Kudryavtsev, 'O distsiplinarnom ustave 1875 g.', p. IOI.
168 Stein, 'Offizier', p. 477.
169 A. Wildman, The End of the Imperial Russian Army: the Old Army and the Soldiers'
.Hevolt, March-April 1917, Princeton, 1980.