66 Muscovite Roots, 1462-1689
In June 1670, during the revolt ofSten'ka Razin (1667-71), somestrertsyat
Astrakhan· went over to the insurgents, who characteristically formed their
ow;; mu5ketee1 u11it5, a11d there wa:) :'>u111c;: Ji:.dffc::diun i11 ~oni.ingeni.:s stationed
elsewhere along the Volga; but other detachments, particular)~ of Moscow
strertsy, helped to suppress the rebellion, suffering 165 casualt'es in doing
so.^49 By this time the musketeers may be said to have developed a sense of cor-
porate identity and the rudiments of an ideology through which to express it.
Hellie suggests that an awareness of their own obsolescence 'explains their fer-
vent adherence to the eschatological Old Believer movement, for indeed their
world was coming to an end'. so This must remain a suggestive hypothesis,
since there is no hard evidence about their motivations or the extent of sym-
pathy among them for these radical aitics of the official Nikonian Church.
Religious dissidents appear to have had more success in some units than
others, which can be explained partly by the fact that their movement drew its
support from certain regions,^51 and it was the detachments stationed there
which came under its influence.
Opposition to the established order developed naturally out of dissatisfaction
at material and legal disabilities. The musketeers were doubtlessJCalous of the
new-model forces, which received much of the revenue from the tax known as
'musketeers' money' (streletskiye den 'gi). This was usually in arrears, partly
because it was collected by various central organs;^52 in 1679 the task was en-
trusted solely to the Streletskiy chancellery, bur this measure does not seem to
have improved the flow of funds. Officers in charge of musketeer units had
ample opportunity to engage in corrupt practices. Frequently they would
appropriate the men's pay or force them to work on their own lands. Not.-un-
characteristic was the conduct of one K. Yevlev, chief of a unit stationed at
Belgorod, who was accused by his subordinates of causing the death of eight
stref'lsy and the flight of seven others; those who dared to petition against his
abuses 'he beats with cudgels and with his own hands, pulling them by the
beard, and detains overnight in his own house'.^53
Corporal punishment was the normal method of enforcing discipline. An
instruction to the chief of a unit stationed near Pskov in 1677 prescribed beating
for even a single day's absence without leave, 'according to [the gravity of]
their offence'; in such cases the decurion was to be beaten too for neglecting
his supervisory duties and kept in jail for as many days as the absentee remained
at large. The rod was likewise to be applied to the backs of those who committed
robberies, visited a prostitute, played dice, or sheltered fugitives in their
homes.^54 There are touches of paranoia and sadism about this document, with
(^49) Avrich, Russ. Rebels, pp. 75, 80, 82-6; A. A. Novosel' sky and V. I. Lebedev (eds.), Krest.
voyna pod predvodite/'stvom S. Rozina: sb. dok., Moscow, 1954-62, ii. 136; iii. 187, 209, 224,
237, 248, 274-6.
50 Hellie, Enserfment, p. 207.
51 Mel'gunov, Relig.-obshch. dvizheniya, p. 65.
52 Al v. 48. 53 AMG iii. 185 (1660).
54 'Strei. sluzhba', pp. 17-22; cf. DAI viii. 42 (1678).