Musketeers and Other Traditional Forces 71
measures taken were mild in comparison with those of Alexis-or of Peter I.
Sofia wished to be thought an enlightened ruler and knew that her authority
was weak. She was content to reduce by one-third the size of the musketeer
forces in Moscow, which by December 1683 numbered 9,542 men in twelve
regiments.^66 The others were sent to the provinces, where a screening operation
was carried out. Men whose conduct was considered suspect were reassigned to
other units, but it seems that none of them were discharged. Some were posted
to a new composite (sborniy) regiment at Sevsk, where their families were
allowed to join them. The hope of a return to the capital, and thus to favour,
kept the exiles loyal. Despite or because of this lenient treatment there was
continuing nervousness among metropolitan nobles at the security threat
which the strel'tsy supposedly represented. 'They are most insolent whenever
an occasion presents itself and inspire the greatest fear in Moscow', reported
a Czech Jesuit who lived in the city from 1686 to 1689, here doubtless convey-
ing the views of the noblemen he mixed with.^67 In 1687 there were signs that
the government was easing its attitude to the musketeers, partly because they
were needed to fight foreign foes and partly because they now seemed less
menacing than the elite 'play regiments' (poteshnye: see below, p. 98) which
the young Tsar Peter had been allowed to set up, ostensibly for his own amuse-
ment, and was industriously exercising under the tutelage of foreign officers.
It was from this direction that the fatal challenge to Sofia's shaky authority
came in the summer of 1689. The government's prestige had been undermined
by two fruitless and costly campaigns against the Crimean Tatars. To make
matters worse, the returning army was publicly acclaimed as if it had been vic-
torious and itsi:Ommanders, including the regent's favourite V. V. Golitsyn,
received unusually lavish rewards.^68 Peter found a pretext to provoke an open
breach with Sofia, and for some weeks the two armed camps eyed one another
with mounting suspicion, each fearing a coup by the other. Sofia's guard in-
cluded several stre/'tsy detachments, but their morale was uncertain. The
regent, not wishing to antagonize her opponents, took no steps to win them
over to her side. The denouement came about almost accidentally on the
night of 7 August. An alarming report prompted Peter to flee from Preobra-
zhenskoye, just outside Moscow, to the Trinity monastery. Here the
Naryshkins proceeded to copy faithfully the tactics employed by the Miloslav-
skys seven years earlier, summoning various units in succession to attend. Two
stre/'tsy regiments, those of L. P. Sukharev and I. E. Tsykler, were committed
to Peter from the start; indeed, it was several men from the latter unit who
triggered the affair by reporting-mistakenly, as it appears-that Sofia was
about to act. The other musketeers offered no resistance on Sofia's behalf.
66 Medvedev, Sozertsaniye, p. 180; Buganov, Mosk. vosstaniya, p. 353; Vosstaniye 1682 g.,
pp. 267-75.
67 G. David SJ, Status modernus Magnae Russiae ... (1690), ed. A. V. Florovskij, The Hague
and Paris, 1965, pp. 86-7.
68 DR V xvii. 284-355.