17 Conquest and ExileRusso-Turkish War) and France (the revolution of 1789).^29 The sav-
agery of this event would frequently be remembered and alluded to
by Russians throughout the nineteenth century as an example of
what the Caucasus could expect, were it not for their presence.
Cruelty and plunder, many Russians assumed, were typical facets of
life under an “Oriental” and Muslim despot. General Tsitsianov’s
murder was another incident of considerable pedagogic significance
for Russians. Pavel D. Tsitsianov (Paata Tsitsishvili), a Russian-
educated Georgian who was remembered during Vorontsov’s time
for his fair treatment of the Georgian nobility, was murdered by the
Baku khan, Hussein Kuli, in Baku in 1806.^30 In the retelling of this
story, Georgia again appeared as Russia’s ally against the Muslims.
Tsitsianov, the Russian press emphasized, had arrived in Baku in an-
ticipation of negotiation and had previously written to Hussein Kuli
as “brother to brother,” hoping that they would “eternally remain
friends.”^31 Yet the incorrigible khan took advantage of the truce to
murder the well-intentioned Tsitsianov, or so the story went. The for-
tieth anniversary of his death was commemorated by the newspaper
Kavkaz in 1846.^32
poddanstvo
The inhabitants of the frontier found themselves caught between ri-
val empires. For the mountaineers, sometimes there were money and
contacts to be made as a result of the conflict. Tsebel’din (Adygei)
prince Skhotsa Temurkva, in return for a significant financial reward
from Baron Rozen, helped Russian forces along the Black Sea coast in
their attack on the Abkhaz in 1837.^33 Bell supposedly offered the
Ubykhs 1 million rubles for the head of Raevskii.^34 Early Russian in-
terest in the mountaineers was thus motivated by such concerns.
Local rulers, such as Prince Mikhail Shervashidze of Abkhazia, were
often useful to the Russians because they informed them of the activi-
ties of British ships along the Abkhaz shore.^35 As Russian military of-
ficials encountered the different tribes of the North Caucasus, they
attempted to secure affirmations of “loyalty” from their tribal lead-
ers. From the Russian point of view, these often consisted simply of a
commitment not to engage in “predatory” raids upon Cossack regi-
ments or tribes whose previous pledge of loyalty to Russia made
them “subjects” (poddannyi) of the Russian tsar.^36
The interest of the regime in securing the loyalty of prominent
mountain leaders was prompted by Russia’s difficulties in prosecuting
what rapidly developed into a protracted guerilla war in the North
Caucasus. The practice was also a logical extension of traditional