86 the partition of palestineThe UN Special Session
Before examining the Indian proposal, it is essential to remem-
ber certain parallel developments in Palestine and India. The period
from April to September 1947 was critical for both. As the Palestinian
issue came up before the United Nations, India was preparing for in de-
pen dence. Despite being a dominion of the British Empire, it was a
founding member of the United Nations, and Nehru had formed an in-
terim government in September 1946. The United Nations began to dis-
cuss the Palestine problem in April 1947; India gained in de pen dence on
August 15, 1947, when the fi nal deliberations of the UNSCOP were un-
derway. The UN report was submitted exactly two weeks later. The develop-
ments in the subcontinent shaped and infl uenced India’s position in the
United Nations.
By then, the contours of India’s position on the Palestine question
were fi rmly in place. Despite internal contradictions and gradual modifi -
cations in subsequent years, Mahatma Gandhi’s famous statement about
Palestine belonging to the Arabs largely refl ected the prevailing consen-
sus. At the same time, INC leaders were aware that any solution to the
problem should not ignore Jewish interests and aspirations. How could
Jewish aspirations be satisfi ed without diluting the Arab character of
Palestine? How does one reconcile the irreconcilable?
As World War II ended, it was obvious that Great Britain was trying to
administer an inherently contradictory and unworkable Mandate in Pales-
tine. Its promises to Sharif Hussein of Mecca (enshrined in the Hussein-
McMahon correspondence) could not be squared with its pledges to the
Zionists under the Balfour Declaration. For over two de cades, it unsuccess-
fully tried to reconcile these two. Even the once- friendly Zionists turned
against them. Revisionist groups such as Irgun, headed by Menachem Be-
gin, launched a full- fl edged terror campaign. The economic cost of win-
ning World War II and its dependence upon the Marshall Plan compelled
Britain to reassess its overseas commitments. The decision to withdraw
from India further diminished the importance of Palestine to the declining
empire. London had to admit failure and cut its losses. But it still needed a
face- saving formula.^4
On April 2, 1947, Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, formally
requested that the UN secretary- general “summon as soon as possible” a
special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting
“a special committee” to decide the “future government in Palestine.”^5