without the help of these countries in the fi rst World War, the question
which we are called upon to consider might never have arisen.”^39 The
committee accepted his suggestion and held a special session in Beirut.
There was a notable absentee: Transjordan. Thus, before heading to the
Beirut meeting, Rahman proceeded to Amman and lunched with Emir
Abdullah. In his assessment, Abdullah was prepared to accept a partition
plan if it meant signifi cant territorial gains favoring Transjordan.^40 Dur-
ing the deliberations, Rahman was less friendly toward the Zionists than
Asaf Ali. While cross- examining the Jewish Agency testimonies before
the committee as well as in his dissent note, Rahman exhibited a strong
prejudice against Zionism and some of its principal fi gures.^41
Was the stance taken by Abdur Rahman his own, or was he represent-
ing the views of the government of India?
Within hours of the formation of the UNSCOP, Asaf Ali reminded
New Delhi of the prevailing consensus in New York that nominees to the
committee should be “persons of high character and standing in public
life [and] preferably with grasp of international aff airs and free from inter-
ference by nominating governments.” He also reported that both the United
States and Great Britain “are in favor of a declaration that members of the
Special Committee will act on behalf of the United Nations as a whole
and will not (repeat not) be subject to direction by their government.”^42 Iran
took this sentiment seriously, and its representative, Nasrollah Entezam,
told the session that the Ira ni an representative to the UNSCOP would be
given complete freedom and would not receive any instructions from
Tehran regarding his functions and recommendations. This, however,
was not the case with India. Nehru actively intervened, diluted, modifi ed,
and even dictated the views of his nominee. The federal plan was Nehru’s
brainchild. Rahman merely acted as midwife.
When elected to the UNSCOP in May 1947, India was formalizing its
in de pen dence, and Nehru was presiding over the interim government.
Personally approving the nomination, on May 24, Nehru reminded Rah-
man of his role in the UNSCOP: “How to reconcile the two [Arab and
Jewish] claims is the problem before us. I do not venture to express an
opinion except vaguely to say that perhaps an autonomous Jewish area
within an in de pen dent Palestine might lead to a solution.... The gen-
eral attitude of India must necessarily be friendly to both parties but
clearly indicating that an agreement must have Arab approval.”^43 This
largely refl ected the prevailing thinking in the Congress Party over the
future of Palestine. On the eve of World War II, it called for the establish-
94 the partition of palestine