156 d omestic politicswere doubts in Washington regarding the Indian position. Would its en-
ergy ties compel New Delhi to side with Iran, or would its newly found
friendship with the United States tilt the balance in that direction? Added
to these doubts was a new factor: the Shia population. Addressing a press
conference in New York on September 16, 2005, Prime Minister Manmo-
han Singh observed: “We have world’s second largest Shia population in
our country. So we have to weigh all these factors.”^57 While in the past,
Indian leaders were reluctant to admit the Muslim factor, the controversy
surrounding Ira ni an nuclear ambitions compelled even the INC leaders
to admit the Shia factor. Not to be left behind, even the opposition harped
on this. Protesting the government’s decision to side with the United
States over Iran, the opposition held a massive public rally in November
2005 in Lucknow, a major Shia center in India.
At times, to appreciate the domestic dimension, one has to demystify
academic vagueness. Examining Nehru’s policy, Heptulla claims that
initially he wanted to adopt a “neutral” stance on the Arab- Israeli confl ict.
He preferred a position that was favorable to Arabs but not hostile to Jews,
because “Nehru did not want the issue to aff ect the Muslim populace of
India [and] that the separatist elements in India be given a boost by this
rise of pan- Islamism.”^58 In plain En glish, this meant that Nehru feared
losing out the minorities if he adopted a pro- Israel stand.
Even after the normalization of relations, India was reluctant to forge
closer ties with Israel. In early 1993, the media partly attributed the re-
fusal to sign a civil- aviation agreement to Civil Aviation Minister Ghulam
Nabi Azad’s “fear of alienating a large section of the Muslims in the coun-
try.”^59 Remarks by Defense Minister Sharad Pawar about cooperating with
Israel on counterterrorism evoked criticism from some Muslim lawmak-
ers.^60 Frequent offi cial denials of any military cooperation with Israel was
due to domestic pressure. Despite the secular- left fi g leaf, many of the
protests in New Delhi and other parts of India against the September
2003 visit of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon were or ga nized by various Mus-
lim organizations.^61 Even those who had been reconciled to normalization
often take exception to military cooperation with Israel. Refl ecting this
argument, one scholar observed that “India is capable of tackling the Paki-
stani threat by itself and on the basis of its own capability and experience.
But to give the impression that India will tackle this threat with [Israeli]
expertise or experience, sends the wrong signal to many people both at
home and abroad.”^62 People “at home” is a euphemism for Indian Muslims;
“abroad” refers to Arab and Islamic countries.