more than the opinions prevailing at this time among the Asiatic
people.”^75 Its isolation in the Middle East did not allow Israel to be indif-
ferent toward the Asian countries, but in the post- Bandung years, its in-
terest in the continent decreased considerably. Any lingering doubts
about India’s Israel policy were settled during the Suez crisis, which
broke out a few months later.
The Suez Crisis, 1956
The crisis following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in mid-
1956 provides a number of insights into India’s Israel policy. It highlighted
the depth of India’s closeness to Egypt. Simultaneously, it underscored
Nehru’s disengagement from his earlier commitment to normalize rela-
tions with Israel. The causes and consequences of the war are too widely
known to need fresh elaboration.^76 The general Indian position regarding
the crisis leading up to the war can be summarized as follows:
- India did not question Egypt’s right to nationalize the Suez Canal,
even though it had reservations over how President Nasser handled the
situation. Speaking at the London Conference on September 20, 1956,
Krishna Menon, India’s defense minister, felt that nationalization “was
an act which was within the competence of the Egyptian government....
We would like to have seen that nationalization carried out in the nor-
mal way of international expropriation, where there is adequate notice,
and the way of taking over is less dramatic and does not lead to these
consequences.”^77 - India believed that a failure to fi nd a peaceful solution to the crisis
could lead to a military confrontation. On August 8, Prime Minister
Nehru told the Lok Sabha that he would be failing in his duty “if I do not
say that threats to settle this dispute or to enforce their [that is, British and
French] views in this matter by display or use of force, is the wrong way.”^78 - India had serious economic and strategic interests in the canal and
was concerned over its unhindered operation. - India declared that it would “decline participation in any arrange-
ments for war preparations or sanctions or any steps which challenge the
sovereign rights of Egypt.”^79 - During the London Conference, Krishna Menon spelled out a six-
point formula as the basis for a settlement.^80 Even after the failure of two
196 nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964