the imperial power and its interests. Obviously the Zionists could not have
fought the British, the only power that was prepared to endorse and help
their po liti cal aspirations, and still hope for a Jewish national home in
Palestine. Following Israel’s and India’s in de pen dence, the two countries
took divergent paths. Anti- imperialism emerged as a cornerstone of
India’s foreign policy; driven by regional hostility and isolation, Israel was
compelled to continue and even strengthen its links with the imperial
powers. Such a stand complicated things for Israel, especially when anti-
colonialism and anti- imperialism became the theme song for the newly
in de pen dent countries of the Third World.
Second, the partition of the subcontinent was relatively easy and mu-
tually accepted. Despite their ideological reservations and opposition, the
mainstream nationalists accepted the religion- based partition of India.
The Congress Party opposed the two- nation theory propounded by
Mohammed Ali Jinnah but accepted the communal partition as a price
for freedom. Despite the communal riots that followed, both the Con-
gress Party and the Muslim League accepted and implemented the parti-
tion of the subcontinent. This was not the case in the Middle East. The
Arab majority in Palestine unanimously rejected the UN plan that advo-
cated the partition of the Mandate territory into in de pen dent Arab and
Jewish states. They were supported by the neighboring Arab countries,
who opposed, both po liti cally and militarily, the implementation of the
UN plan. Indeed, until the late 1980s, mainstream Palestinian leader-
ship refused to accept the UN resolution of November 29, 1947.^14 As a
result, unlike South Asia, the division of Palestine proved to be agoniz-
ing, complicated, and protracted. This in turn had negative repercus-
sions for Israel and its po liti cal and diplomatic fortunes.
Third, India’s identifi cation with the pro cess of decolonization in Asia
and Africa was consistent and hence relatively fruitful. Israel, on the other
hand, could not take a stand. Preoccupation over its problems with the
Arab world forced it to be less enthusiastic about decolonization. The
convergence of its interests with France over Algeria, for example, led to
both countries forging closer ties in the 1950s and resulted in nuclear
cooperation. The same holds true for other former colonies who gained
in de pen dence from the Eu ro pe an powers. As with the yishuv over British
India, the colonial powers proved to be po liti cally more attractive to Israel
than the liberation movements.
Fourth, India was more fortunate than Israel in facing or ga nized hostil-
ity. In spite of its best eff orts, Pakistan was unable to forge an anti- Indian
introduction 7