Because it had initiated hostilities, Israel could not escape from criticism
over the death of the peacekeepers.
At the same time, it is essential to recall that when India reacted to the
killing, it was reacting on the basis of unconfi rmed media reports. A de-
tailed fi rsthand account of the hostilities and casualties was available
only after June 26, when Rikhye reached New York and was contacted by
the military adviser of India’s UN mission.^32 This was nearly three weeks
after the commencement of hostilities. Based on Rikhye’s published ac-
count, a more complicated picture surrounding the Indian casualties
emerges: (1) “It was the Arab mines placed on the railroad crossing south
of Gaza that killed Captain Vijay Sachar and his fellow passengers in the
car.”^33 (2) Both Israeli shells and Arab mortar bombs killed and wounded
soldiers at Camp Delhi near the Dier al- Balah railway station. (3) The In-
dian supply convoy returning from Rafah was caught in the advancing
Israeli armor near Khan Yunis. (4) Consequent to the initial attacks, In-
dian soldiers took shelter in Egyptian trenches, and when the trenches
were overrun by Israelis, they were taken prisoner. “The Israelis found
the Indians carry ing their personal weapons and assumed that they had
been fi ghting along with the Egyptians.”^34 (5) The Indian camp in Dier el
Balah and the Palestinian defenses were in close proximity.^35 (6) The
early withdrawal of the Canadian contingent seriously aff ected air trans-
port and quick evacuation of the UNEF contingent in Gaza. (7) India,
which was the fi rst country to accept Nasser’s demand for the withdrawal
of the UNEF, “never earmarked any military air transport to support its
contingent in Gaza.”^36 (8) The baggage of the Indian contingent that
reached Gaza via a chartered ship was an additional impediment to air-
lifting the troops, because “converting a shipload to an aircraft seemed an
insuperable diffi culty.”^37 In other words, the unfortunate death of mem-
bers of the Indian contingent was not as premeditated and cold blooded
as New Delhi portrayed.
One could view the entire controversy diff erently. By focusing on the
death of the Indian soldiers, it became relatively easier for New Delhi to
enlist pop u lar support for its policy toward the war. With mounting criti-
cism from the opposition during the run up to the war, the UNEF epi-
sode enabled the government and the Congress Party to partly off set
domestic re sis tance. The absence of relations with Israel and po liti cal
compulsions to support Nasser further aggravated the tension over the
casualties. Scores of Indian soldiers were killed in various peacekeep-
ing operations both before and after the June war, but the UNEF episode
the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984 209