in what was then East Pakistan since March of that year culminated in
the secession and formation of Bangladesh in December 1971. Since
India was largely instrumental in the whole pro cess, how much support
and understanding did it receive from the Middle East? Three distinct
trends are noticeable.
First, the war once again highlighted the Arab and Middle Eastern
commitment to Pakistan. For them, the situation in 1971 was more acute
than during the Indo- Pakistan war of 1965. This time, India was instru-
mental in “cutting Pakistan to size.” For the Arab states and Iran, this
was blatant intervention in the “domestic” aff airs of an Islamic state.
Their support for Pakistan’s territorial integrity far overwhelmed their
sympathy for the victims of the brutality unleashed by the Pakistani mili-
tary junta starting on March 25. Over two million civilians were killed or
maimed, and thousands of women were raped by the army. Yet the Arab
and Islamic countries were not prepared to support India. Countries such
as Iran even provided limited military assistance to Pakistan. Even after
the war, the Islamic world remained cautious in accepting the in de pen-
dence of Bangladesh. Reconciliation between the Islamic world and Ban-
gladesh began only at the second OIC summit, hosted by Pakistan in
Lahore in February 1974.
Second, the Indian interpretation of the Arab position is rather inter-
esting. At one level, it was disappointed at the Arab attitude and their in-
adequate understanding of the crisis over Bangladesh.^62 Medical supplies
and other assistance provided by the Arab countries fi gured prominently.^63
As in the past, India downplayed its disappointment with the po liti cal
stance taken by the Arab countries.
Third, India had carefully avoided mentioning the aid provided by Is-
rael during the crisis. It was not po liti cally correct to admit receiving help
from Israel when it was “dividing” an Islamic state. An open admission
would have sent a wrong message to Islamic countries sympathetic to
Pakistan. It was only after repeated questioning that the government ac-
knowledged that on June 23 the Israeli Knesset had adopted a sympa-
thetic resolution and that Israel off ered to provide medical personnel to
treat the millions of refugees who had fl ed to India.^64
The unfriendly Arab attitude during the crisis rekindled fresh de-
mands for a reassessment of India’s policy toward the Arab states and Is-
rael. The government was clear about its priorities, and Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh told the parliament: “No passing of disappointment should
mar these close relations [that is, between Arabs and India] which are in
the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984 215