226 prelude to normalizationsought rapprochement with Israel. Notwithstanding the Camp David ac-
cords, Egypt was being admitted into the Arab League and the Or ga ni za-
tion of Islamic Conference (OIC). This signaled an Arab and Islamic
inclination toward a possible reconciliation with Israel. Within India’s
neighborhood, Sri Lanka showed that it was possible to cooperate with
Israel even in the fi eld of intelligence without inviting Arab retribution.
These developments clearly underlined that if handled properly, ties with
Israel would not evoke hostile reactions from the Middle East.
How did Rajiv Gandhi capitalize on these favorable circumstances?
How much did he diff er from his pre de ces sors in dealing with Israel?
What were the changes he introduced regarding Israel? How were they
received both within and outside the country? Despite his intentions,
why did he fail to carry the pro cess forward and normalize relations with
the Jewish state?
Improving Signs
Unlike his pre de ces sors, Rajiv Gandhi openly met Israeli offi -
cials and U.S. groups promoting Israel’s foreign- policy interests. While
he avoided making any categorical statement in favor of normalization,
his actions revealed a shift in Indian perceptions. The issue of normaliza-
tion fi gured prominently in his discussions with leading American offi -
cials and was widely reported in the Indian media. There appears to be a
link between these meetings and the gradual relaxation of India’s posi-
tion on Israel. Through these less visible gestures, Gandhi sent positive
signals toward Israel.
Like many of his pre de ces sors, Rajiv Gandhi was under considerable
pressure from Jewish and pro- Israeli organizations in the United States
over normalization. Since the late 1940s, Israel fi gured prominently in
the Indo- U.S. dialogue, and during his tenure these pressures became
more frequent and reasonably successful. While seeking to promote Is-
rael’s interests, its supporters in the United States did not hesitate to oc-
casionally use pressure tactics against India. For example, partly to infl u-
ence New Delhi’s decision regarding the Davis Cup tennis tie with Israel,
in May 1987 the infl uential Anti- Defamation League of B’nai Brith (ADL)
brought out an indictment against India.^5 Recalling a series of past inci-
dents when India refused to grant visas to Israeli nationals and high-
lighting its “anti- Israel” statements and actions, the report warned that