234 prelude to normalizationIsrael, yet when they were in power from 1977 to 1979, they were unable
to transform their demands into concrete policy.
Moreover, under Rajiv there was no parliamentary opposition. In the
1984 Lok Sabha elections, the pro- Israeli Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
won just two seats in the 542- member parliament.^38 The dogmatic Com-
munists, who had won more seats, were never strong allies of Israel. The
emerging third force, namely the Janata Dal under V. P. Singh (who sub-
sequently became prime minister in 1989), was too eager to cultivate
Muslim groups to adopt an overtly pro- Israeli stand.^39 If Rajiv Gandhi
was not prepared to take that step, there also was no opposition to force it.
Third, since the middle of 1987 Rajiv Gandhi had been embroiled in a
multimillion dollar bribery scandal involving the Bofors Company, of
Sweden. Much offi cial attention and eff ort were diverted to countering
charges that the prime minister and his close friends were involved. The
allegation snowballed into a major controversy and resulted in a rapid
erosion of Gandhi’s popularity. Before long, the Congress Party started
losing various crucial elections. With the next parliamentary elections
around the corner, normalization with Israel would have defi nitely com-
plicated the Congress Party’s support base among Muslim voters. Partly
with an eye on the election, in November 1989 India presented the Jawa-
harlal Nehru Award for International Understanding to Arafat.^40
Finally, Israeli involvement in Sri Lanka and its military- intelligence
help to Colombo caused consternation and anxiety in New Delhi.^41 Israel’s
involvement in the ethnic confl ict was viewed negatively in India.^42 The
Sri Lankan civil war has serious ethnic and po liti cal ramifi cations in In-
dia, especially in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. India feared that Is-
raeli involvement would only strengthen Colombo’s drive for a military
solution. As a result, under the July 1987 Indo– Sri Lankan accord, Gandhi
and President J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka agreed that both “will reach
an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign
military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such
presence will not prejudice Indo– Sri Lankan relations.”^43 Israeli involve-
ment in this ethnic crisis partially dampened Gandhi’s desire to pursue
closer ties with Israel.
New Delhi was also worried over Israel’s interests in Fiji, especially in
the wake of the 1987 military coup led by Col. Sitiveni Rabuka. Establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with Israel was the fi rst major decision taken
by the coup leaders.^44 Fiji provided an opening for Israel in the Pacifi c re-
gion, and Foreign Ministry Director General Avraham Tamir visited the