normalization and after 2411991 Lok Sabha election, prominent Muslim leaders of north India aban-
doned the Congress Party and endorsed the Janata Dal led by V. P. Singh.
As a result, the INC was less worried about Muslim leaders than they had
been. Opposition to normalization was confi ned to the communist par-
ties and marginalized groups such as the Janata Dal. Domestic opposi-
tion was also partly mitigated by changes in the Arab attitude toward Is-
rael. The Madrid conference was possible because prominent Islamic
countries such as Saudi Arabia lent their full backing. The willingness of
Arafat to support the pro cess signifi cantly weakened Islamic opposition
to dealing with Israel.
Sixth, it is diffi cult to ignore the security element in Rao’s decision.
The absence of diplomatic relations did not inhibit India from seeking Is-
raeli assistance in the past. During national crises such as the confl ict
with China in 1962 and war with Pakistan in 1965, India sought and ob-
tained a limited quantity of small arms and ammunition from Israel.^11
Due to po liti cal compulsions, it had rarely acknowledged the help pro-
vided by Israel. At the same, these incidents reveal that despite hostile
public postures, many Indian leaders, including Nehru, considered Israel
in friendlier terms and during critical times sought understanding, if not
friendship, with it. In recent years, many have admitted the existence of
prolonged intelligence cooperation with Israel. Such cooperation existed
even during the premiership of Indira Gandhi (1966– 1977; 1980– 1984),
periods generally considered unfriendly toward Israel. According to one
published account, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW, the external-
intelligence arm of India’s intelligence ser vices)
has always had links with the Israelis and the US. In the late 1970s, it
engineered the visit of Moshe Dayan to India; it also played an im-
portant role in trying to get the Israeli defense industry a foothold in
India. RAW sent its personnel to Israel for specialized training and
in late 1984, in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, it also
[sought the advice of ]... a se nior Israeli security specialist on the
Prime Minister’s security systems.^12Furthermore, a former intelligence offi cial disclosed that soon after the
formation of R&AW in September 1968, its chief, Rameshwar Nath Kao,
“with the approval of Indira Gandhi, had set up a secret liaison relation-
ship with Mossad.”^13 Following normalization, security issues have be-
come a major agenda item in Indo- Israeli cooperation. Thus it would be