262 n ormalization and afterwith the Jewish state, were not prepared to hold their relations with New
Delhi hostage to Indo- Israeli ties. This enabled both countries to pursue
serious discussions, dialogues, and dealings even in the military/security
arena. Prolonged neglect and indiff erence did not inhibit India and Israel
from pursuing military transactions and cooperation, and the tacit re-
gional ac cep tance if not endorsement made things a lot easier.
This regional ac cep tance and emerging national consensus enabled
India to pursue a relatively confi dent policy toward Israel unconcerned
about the erstwhile drive for “balance.” Even though Indian leaders were
still meeting Palestinian leaders including Arafat, they were not inhib-
ited from pursuing closer ties with Israel or in publicizing their prefer-
ence for Israel in fi ghting terrorism. Neither the deportation of suspected
Hamas militants in December 1992 nor the Hebron massacre of Febru-
ary 1994, in which scores of Muslim worshippers were killed, evoked ad-
verse reactions from the INC government in India. This subtle pro- Israeli
position was more clearly manifested when the BJP was in power during
1998 and 2004. While Indian offi cials continued to meet the Palestinian
leader when they visited Israel, the shift was discernable. The World Con-
ference Against Racism held in Durban in August 2001 was an impor-
tant moment in Indo- Israeli relations. Under Arab pressure, the confer-
ence agenda included a strong condemnation of Israel and depicted
Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. Capitalizing on
the international condemnation over the al- Aqsa intifada, Arab and Is-
lamic countries sought to resurrect the 1975 UN resolution that had been
annulled in December 1991. Despite pressure from some Islamic coun-
tries, India, which had supported both the original resolution describing
Zionism as a form of racism and its subsequent revocation in 1991, was
not prepared to go back to the past.
The response of the Indian government to the outbreak of the intifada
and prolonged violence was also muted. Unlike the past, it limited its re-
actions to counseling restraint on both sides. The Israeli policy of assas-
sinating key Palestinian po liti cal and military leaders evoked only a mild
rebuke. It was not prepared to condemn Israel and its leaders for their
repeated personal threats against Yasser Arafat. Such an attitude was
strongly criticized by the leftist parties. In the words of CPI(M) General
Secretary Harkishan Singh Surjeet, “Even the U.S. state department felt
compelled to urge Israel to keep its promise of not harming Arafat. But
the Vajpayee government is not prepared to issue even such an appeal.”^68
This shift was more blatant when in January 2003 the Indian govern-