conclusion 265along communal lines. A large portion of the Muslim community re-
jected Pakistan and stayed behind in a predominantly Hindu but secular
India. This not only vindicated the ideological stand of the Congress
Party but also provided an opportunity for free India to establish its secu-
lar credentials.
India exhibited the same po liti cal realism vis-à- vis Israel. Its advocacy
for a federal solution and opposition to the partition plan in the UN Spe-
cial Committee were part of its larger position regarding religious nation-
alism. During its freedom struggle, India saw Zionism as the external
version of the Muslim League and subsequently Israel as another Paki-
stan. As with the partition of the subcontinent, New Delhi was prepared
to accept the po liti cal situation of the Middle East. Israel had become a
reality and was recognized by a host of countries, including the rival bloc
of the cold war. The hopes for a Palestinian state never materialized be-
cause of inter- Arab squabbles and aggrandizement. India thus had to ap-
proach Israel realistically. If it could accept a “religious partition” in its
neighborhood, how could it adopt a diff erent position with respect to the
Middle East?
There was a fundamental problem, however. While the Indian readi-
ness to accept Pakistan was quick, formal, and complete, Israel was less
fortunate. Indian recognition took more than twenty- eight months to ma-
terialize, and it was not followed by normal relations. In the initial years, it
was eager to establish full relations with Israel, and Prime Minister Jawa-
harlal Nehru made a formal commitment when the se nior Israeli diplo-
mat Walter Eytan met him in New Delhi on March 4, 1952. Nehru even
asked the foreign ministry to prepare a bud get for a resident Indian mis-
sion in Tel Aviv. This never materialized, and normalization became en-
tangled in Indian domestic politics.
Nehru’s cabinet colleague and close confi dant Maulana Azad was of-
ten blamed for the situation. But the problem was much larger. Since the
early 1920s, the Indian nationalists perceived the Middle East, especially
Jewish po liti cal aspirations in Palestine, through an Islamic prism.
Mahatma Gandhi was more honest and candid than most of his contem-
poraries and successors. He was prepared to see the Arab opposition to
Jewish aspirations in Palestine as an Islamic and not a nationalist issue.
He openly endorsed the concept of Jazirat al- Arab and argued that the
Islamic lands of Palestine must not be handed over to non- Muslim rule.
He accepted the divine injunctions of Prophet Mohammed over Islamic
places and explicitly ruled out non- Muslim sovereignty.