- UNSCOP Report, 1:59.
- While expressing his sympathy for the “untold misery” of the Jews, Abdur
Rahman passionately argued: “The duty of fi nding suitable places for these
[displaced] persons rests on the whole of the world and not only on Pales-
tine.” Ibid., 2:75. On another occasion, he wrote: “While the problem of Jewish
immigration is... closely related to the solution of the Palestine question, it
cannot be contemplated that Palestine is to be considered in any sense as a
means of solving the problem of world Jewry.” Ibid., 1:64. - The population distribution of the partition plan is misleading. According to
the plan, the Jewish state would include 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs.
However, it would also include about “90,000 Bedouins, cultivators and
stock own ers who seek grazing further afi eld in dry seasons.” Since this ad-
ditional population was not Jewish, at the time of partition the proposed Jew-
ish state would consist of 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs. It was only after
the Arab- Israeli war of 1948 and the subsequent emigration of Arabs and im-
migration of Jews that Israel acquired Jewish demographic predominance. - Although Tel Aviv was part of the proposed Jewish state, there was no cor-
responding Arab city that could have become the capital of the Arab states.
Having made Jerusalem an international city, the majority plan did not
identify any city as the possible Arab capital. - This was not the fi rst time the question of “dual loyalty” was raised to criti-
cize the Zionist endeavors in Palestine. Prior to the Balfour Declaration,
opponents of the move, including a section of the Anglo Jewry, feared that
special treatment of the Jews in Palestine would question the loyalty of the
Jews in the Diaspora and undermine their hard- earned equality in Eu rope. - Report of Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry Regarding the Problems of
Eu ro pe an Jewry and Palestine, 43. - For instance, Loy W. Henderson, the director of the Near East in the State
Department, drew attention to this problem. His objections were overruled
by the electoral considerations of President Harry S. Truman. For the text of
his assessment, see Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 117– 121. - While the Congress Party never expressed its formal opposition to the Dec-
laration, it was a constant theme in Muslim League circles. Mahatma Gan-
dhi, however, was critical of the Balfour position. In his confi dential note to
Kallenbach in 1937, he observed: “Neither the Mandate nor the Balfour Dec-
laration can... be used in support of sustaining Jewish immigration into
Palestine in the teeth of Arab opposition.” In “Statement Given by Mahatma
Gandhi to Kallenbach on Zionism in July 1937,” CZA, S25/3587. - Speaking at the Special Session, Asaf Ali argued that the language of the
Mandate was inconsistent with the spirit of article 22 of the League of Na-
tions charter. Therefore “it was up to the people of Palestine to go up to the
International Court of Justice... and lodge an appeal against it and get it
reversed. Apparently they did not do it.” UN General Assembly, First Special
Session, A/BUT/P.V.30 (April 30, 1947), 11. - UNSCOP Report, 2:38.
5. the partition of palestine 291
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