18 introductionmaterials currently available in New Delhi, acrimonious debates in the
Indian parliament, and declassifi ed materials in Israel, one can reason-
ably conclude that the domestic factor played an important role in India’s
understanding of Jewish history and its policy regarding Israel. Behind
the offi cial secular discourse lies a deeply seated domestic, demo cratic,
and demographic rationale: Indian Muslims.
Compulsions
Despite the obvious handicaps, it is possible to reconstruct
some of the key developments regarding Israel. The most critical devel-
opment regarding normalization happened in early 1952. In March of
that year, Prime Minister Nehru made a commitment to normalization
when Walter Eytan, the senior- most Israeli diplomat, came to New Delhi
to expedite the pro cess of establishing formal relations. A vast majority
of Indian leaders and diplomats left a favorable impression upon Eytan
regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations. Nehru, who was
concurrently serving as India’s foreign minister, even instructed his of-
fi cials to prepare the bud get for a resident Indian mission in Tel Aviv.
The Israeli visitor was informed that a formal decision would be taken
by the Indian cabinet “within the next few weeks,” following the fi rst
Lok Sabha elections. This did not happen— or rather, it only happened
four de cades later.
By all accounts, both Indian and Israeli ones, the veteran Muslim
leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad stood in the way of normalization. The
Congress Party president during World War II, he was a cabinet col-
league and close confi dant of Prime Minister Nehru. Often portrayed as
Nehru’s “adviser on Arab aff airs,” he was held responsible for the absence
of relations. Citing opposition from the domestic Muslim population and
possible “mischief” by Pakistan in the Middle East, Azad persuaded the
prime minister to defer normalization. Nehru, who had unquestionable
sway over India’s foreign policy both before and after India became in de-
pen dent, bowed to the wishes of the senior- most Muslim leader within
the government and Congress Party. Apparently, this policy shift and
postponement was not communicated to Israel. An indirect hesitation
regarding Israel came in 1955, when India reluctantly bowed to the Arab
veto over Israel’s participation at the Bandung Afro- Asian Conference. A
more pronounced statement regarding normalization came during the