Nehru dwelled on the Zionist’s reliance on the British for their po liti cal
goals in Palestine. The marginal improvement following India’s recogni-
tion of Israel was jolted in 1956, when Israel allied with the imperial pow-
ers and attacked Egypt. India’s leaders soon reverted to their pre- 1947
position and identifi ed Israel with imperialism. So overwhelming was
Nehru’s infl uence that even his death in 1964 did not alter these basic
tenets.
In 1962, Nehru’s utopian worldview crumbled along the Himalayas.
His failure to safeguard India’s vital interests forced him to settle for a
more realistic foreign policy, and he revisited some of the issues over
which he had held strong reservations in the past. His seeking of mili-
tary aid from Israel, however, was only temporary, and the post- Nehru
Indian leadership again was unfriendly, critical, and at times hostile to-
ward the Jewish state. What Nehru could not do his successors could not
even dream of. The Soviet Union’s decision to terminate relations with
Israel following the June war added an ideological dimension.
This raises another question. Why did Nehru and his successors fail to
distinguish between the normalization of relations and India’s diff er-
ences with Israel over other issues? Why did bilateral relations become
hostage to Israel’s policy toward the Arabs? Why did India allow third par-
ties to undermine its bilateral relations with Israel when it had no prob-
lems or disputes with the Jewish state?
A possible explanation has to be located in India’s limited po liti cal le-
verage and economic dependence on the outside world. During much of
the cold war, it remained a marginal player. The po liti cal and diplomatic
clout it enjoyed in the early years came to an abrupt end following the
1962 Sino- Indian war. During the cold war, a strong po liti cal stand on
various issues remained the principal method by which India could
make its presence felt. India’s pro- Soviet foreign- policy slant gradually
eroded its moral high ground. Its tolerance of the Hungary, Czech o slo-
vak i a, and Af ghan i stan episodes dented the moral component of its for-
eign policy. Furthermore, the po liti cal role India visualized for itself was
not accompanied by any corresponding economic component. It had long
depended on the outside world for various forms of economic aid, assis-
tance, and even largesse. Its early economic growth rested on massive aid
from the United States in the form of PL- 480 and support for a green
revolution in agriculture. From the mid- 1950s, the Soviet Union was a
key player in its industrialization, and it provided the backbone of the
Indian military. India also was dependent on the Middle East and during
introduction 21