a simple explanation of a complex reality. While the Arab nationalists
were fi ghting the British in Palestine, they felt that the Zionists were co-
operating with and benefi ting from the Mandate authorities. This impe-
rialist connection dominated Nehru’s thinking and his refusal to endorse
Zionist aspirations in Palestine. Commenting on this, Ariel Glucklich
stated: “instead of identifying Zionism with modern liberation move-
ments, Indian intellectuals identify Zionism with its countries of
origin— as En glish, Rus sian, and American colonialism.”^51 While the
Mahatma advised the yishuv to abandon relying on “British bayonets,”
Nehru demanded that Zionists prove their credentials by siding with the
anti- imperialist struggle of the Arabs.
Three, as will be discussed below, religious considerations played a
critical role in India’s unfriendly and indiff erent attitude toward Zionism.
Commenting on the role played by the Jews in shaping the U.S. policies,
one U.S. congressman observed: “Israel succeeds in the Congress for the
simple reason. Two or three per cent of the voters care intensely about it
and the rest are uninformed and don’t care.”^52 This logic is equally appli-
cable to India’s Middle East policy. The Arab viewpoint on Palestine was
strongly articulated by the Muslim leadership both within and outside the
Congress Party. Declarations and resolutions on Palestine adopted by
various Muslim organizations such as the Muslim League, the All- India
Khilafat Committee, and Jamaa’t ulema- e-Hind testify to the attitude of
the Muslims of the Raj.^53
During the Khilafat period, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party
did not hesitate to endorse Islamic claims over Palestine and the need to
preserve it under Islamic rule. But they were not ready to accept Jewish
religious claims to the same territory. As manifested by the Mahatma,
the Indian attitude was conditioned by the need for Hindu- Muslim unity
against the British. This became acute in the 1930s when the Muslim
League began presenting itself as the authentic voice of the Muslims of
the subcontinent. As the Muslim League was demanding the abrogation
of the Balfour Declaration,^54 the Congress Party felt compelled to be more
supportive of the Arabs of Palestine. Endorsing the Arab cause alone
would not have ensured Muslim support for the Congress Party. But it is
reasonably certain that a contrary position on Palestine would have alien-
ated the Muslim minority from the Congress Party and pushed it closer
to the Muslim League. Though couched in anti- imperialism, the pro-
Arab stand of the Congress Party was primarily a po liti cal move driven by
domestic calculations.
the congress party and the yishuv 55