80 the islamic prismareas forming Pakistan.^41 For Palestine, however, Nehru advocated a fed-
eral arrangement, something he was not prepared to accept in the Indian
subcontinent. Despite past opposition, India eventually accepted Pakistan
as an in de pen dent state, and for similar reasons it recognized the state of
Israel. Continued opposition to the partition of Palestine after a similar
religious division of British India would have raised doubts over New
Delhi’s ac cep tance of the sovereignty of Pakistan. For the Congress Party,
opposition to partition both in India and Palestine was a principled moral
stand, and its subsequent recognition of both Pakistan and Israel were
signs of po liti cal pragmatism.
For its part, the Muslim League faced a diff erent kind of dilemma vis-
à- vis Palestine. Its arguments that the Muslims were a separate nation on
account of their religion could not be extended to Palestine, where Mus-
lims were in the majority. That would have compelled the Muslim League
to recognize the claims of the Jews being a distinct nation on account of
their non- Muslim religious affi liation. The arguments of the Muslim
League— and later on Pakistan— however, were much narrower, as both
adopted a converse position vis-à- vis the Jews of Palestine. Partition was
essential for the welfare of the Muslims of India but was an unacceptable
proposition in Palestine because it was anti- Muslim. As S. M. Burke aptly
put it: “While the device of dividing the country provided the only means
of real freedom to the Indian Muslims, the very word partition was anath-
ema to Muslims elsewhere.”^42
This tussle between the INC and the Muslim League for Muslim sup-
port partly contributed to the yishuv’s interest in India. If the Islamic fac-
tor infl uenced the thinking of Indian nationalists toward the problem in
Palestine, the yishuv leadership was equally worried about the attitude of
Indian Muslims in the unfolding problem. On at least four occasions, the
Zionist leadership showed concerns about Indian Muslims and their im-
pact upon the Jewish homeland project in Palestine. The fi rst occasion
was during the run up to the Balfour Declaration. Due to concerns over
Muslim opinion, se nior offi cials in the India Offi ce warned their govern-
ment against endorsing Zionist aspirations in Palestine.^43 The second
occasion arose in January 1931, when the mufti of Jerusalem off ered to
bury the body of Mohammad Ali in the Harem al- Sharif. Alarmed by its
po liti cal ramifi cations, Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist
Or ga ni za tion, met Mohammad Ali’s elder brother, Shaukat Ali, in Lon-
don. This was the fi rst known contact between the Zionist leadership and
an Indian leader. Weizmann hoped to persuade Shaukat, who would be