82 the islamic prismthe princely state of Bikaner, was a member of the Indian delegation to
the conference. After the conference, when Bergmann visited Bikaner,
Panikkar “revealed himself... as an ardent friend of our cause and gave
important advice as to our future work in India. This advice he wrote
down in a memorandum sent by him to Palestine.”^48 Panikkar off ered
meaningful suggestions to the Zionists in a two- page memorandum curi-
ously titled A Memorandum on Hindu- Zionist Relations.^49 Written on April
8, 1947, this document throws an interesting light on his overall under-
standing of the Palestine problem, his evaluation of the Indian po liti cal
climate on the eve of partition, and its relevance for the post- 1947 Indian
policy toward the po liti cal aspirations of the Jews.
Panikkar began his note with an emphasis on Islam and its role in
Indian policy. Because “Islam is a minority in India,” he argued, “the feel-
ing of Muslim solidarity is greater in India than perhaps anywhere else
in the Islamic world.” Due to the prevailing po liti cal climate on the eve of
partition, the Hindus would unconditionally support “all matters on
which Islam feels strongly.” Therefore, as far as Palestine was concerned,
“offi cial Indian opinion will not be diff erent from that of Islamic coun-
tries, though it is unlikely that India will do more than follow the lead of
the Arab countries in this matter.”^50
Even though this was the prevailing position, Panikkar argued that “it
will be wrong to think that Hindu opinion is solidly in favor of Islamic
claims in Palestine.” Sympathy for the Jewish cause was inevitable, due
to the “stiff ening of Hindu opinion generally towards Muslims in the in-
ternal politics and... because of a genuine and natural sympathy to-
wards the suff erings of the Jews.” Once the Muslim League succeeded in
creating a separate Islamic state in the subcontinent, “Hindu opinion on
the question of Palestine will fi nd its natural and untrammeled expres-
sion.” He went on to predict that once Pakistan was established, “Hindu
leaders and politicians may well take a pro- Zionist line.” He blamed the
Zionists for their prolonged neglect and indiff erence toward India, which
he felt was responsible for the absence of sympathy “even in orthodox
Hindu quarters towards Zionist claims.” He was optimistic and visual-
ized “increasing realization on the side of the Zionists that Asia will count
a great deal more in world politics, and that Asia is not predominantly Is-
lamic, but Hindu and Chinese.” He predicted that Hindus would appre-
ciate that “a Zionist Palestine may be an important link in the defense
policy of India, that it may, with the support of Eu ro pe an nations, be an
eff ective counter- weight to an alliance of Islamic countries in the Middle