84 the islamic prismthe evolution of a “Hindu” opinion. Other than adopting the Machiavellian
logic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” there is no compelling reason
for a Hindu to be passionate about the holy land or Jazirat al- Arab. As a
gentile, kafi r, infi del, and pagan, a Hindu has no sentimental attachment
toward Palestine, Israel, or the holy land. The Promised Land— the Jewish,
Islamic, or Christian version— is as good, as bad, and as consequential as
Alaska. The post- 1948 events would disprove Panikkar’s optimism.
Thus, during the nationalist phase, the Congress Party and its leaders
came under two kinds of pressures. At one level, they had to compete
with the Muslim League for the support of the Indian Muslims. A pro-
Arab position helped consolidate INC infl uence among the Indian Mus-
lims. While this alone would have been insuffi cient, a contrary position
would have alienated the party from the Muslims. At another level, INC
opposition to religious separatism meant it was unable to endorse Jewish
nationalist aspirations in Palestine. It could not support the idea of Jews
being a separate nation in Palestine while rejecting similar demands
by the Muslim League in India. Thus the Congress Party became pro-
Muslim vis-à- vis its domestic constituency and pro- Arab vis-à- vis its ex-
ternal audience. Both positions worked in tandem. At the same time,
INC opposition to partitions proved futile. Both India and Palestine were
partitioned along religious lines, and India was forced to come to terms
with both new realities. This recognition was relatively easier with respect
to Pakistan, given the two countries’ geographic proximity and shared
history. Recognizing the partition of Palestine, however, took longer, as the
domestic opinion on Israel still remained contentious. Additionally, there
was also the Arab factor to contend with.