101The political compulsions to minimize the Pakistani influence upon its
relations with the outside world and economic growth resulted in India
de-hyphenating Pakistan from its engagements with the Middle East. As
discussed elsewhere, the process began with the visit of External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh to the Kingdom in January 2001 and has been
continuing since then. This is not to suggest that Pakistan has become
irrelevant in its foreign policy calculus but India’s worldview is less deter-
mined by the Pakistan factor.
Such an approach has also pleased Riyadh as it was no longer forced to
choose between the two South Asian neighbours, an Islamic ally or a part-
ner for the future development. Gradually, Saudi Arabia began viewing the
two South Asian countries under two distinct prisms. Reflecting this, on
the eve of his visit to India in 2006, King Abdullah referred to Pakistan as
a brother and India as a friend (NDTV 2006 ); the former is a given, over
which one has no control, but the latter is choice and hence is more endur-
ing. Similarly speaking to the media in New Delhi in early 2016, Saudi
Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir remarked: “Pakistan is a historic ally and
will remain so. Our relations with Pakistan do not come at the expense of
our relations with India. India is a strategic relationship in all fields” (sic
Bagchi 2016 ).
The shift in India’s thinking has been favoured by an upsurge of differ-
ences and tensions between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia over a host of issues.
Since 1996, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were the only other powers which
recognized the Pakistan-backed Taliban rule in Afghanistan but September
11 terror attacks forced the Gulf Arab monarchies to reverse their erst-
while benevolent approach to extremism and their recognition was quietly
withdrawn two weeks after the September 11 attacks (Burns and Wren
2001 ). Pakistan providing sanctuary to Osama Bin-Laden and its pro-
longed denial of him living in the country until his killing by the US
Special Forces in May 2011 had few takers.
Partly to overcome the negative stereotypes against Wahhabi Islam, al-
Saud began taking steps in fighting religious extremism both within and
outside the Kingdom. This, in turn, resulted in Riyadh increasing its secu-
rity cooperation with India and extradited or expelled many persons
wanted for terrorism or other criminal offenses in India. Zabiuddin Ansari,
who was holding Pakistani passport, was deported despite objections from
Islamabad (Tankel 2012 ). Reflecting on this, head of the National Security
Advisory Board Naresh Chandra remarked that “there’s a genuine con-
cern in the Saudi establishment that things may get out of hand” in
PAKISTAN FACTOR