131of the USSR was a severe security challenge as military supplies were
disrupted and India had to negotiate independently with newly indepen-
dent former Soviet republic for the urgently needed spare parts and
maintenance. Domestically the 1990s also witnessed political instability,
communal violence and social upheavals which in turn have slowed down
the reform process.
Interestingly, the decision of Vajpayee government to exercise the
nuclear option and conduct the Pokhran-II in May 1998 proved to be a
blessing in disguise. In its immediate aftermath, the US led the interna-
tional uproar and sanctions and for the first time in its history, India was
almost alone in the international scene; if the nuclear haves do not wish
to lose their hegemony to India, the nuclear have-nots were peeved at
India abandoning its decades-long opposition to nuclear weapons. In its
initial response to the tests the Clinton Administration announced its
determination to ‘stop, freeze and rollback’ (Kampani 2001 ) India’s
nuclear capabilities led to a host of stringent economic sanctions and
political isolation. There were apprehensions within the country that
India was “weaker and much more vulnerable to external powers and
arms twisting” than it was before the nuclear tests (Ram 1999 ). This was
also the most controversial foreign policy decision since 1947 as everyone
was not enamoured by the NDA government’s decision to conduct
the tests (Ram 1999 ). Moreover, this time around, India did not have the
benefit of Moscow’s support as Russia was yet to come out of the
economic quagmire that led to its collapse and disintegration.
The vulnerability to the US-led sanctions (Morrow and Carriere 1999 ;
Rennack 2003 ) ironically proved to be a boon. The impending political
isolation and clouds of possible surrender to the Washington Consensus
meant that India would have to reorient its worldview and act differently.
A militarily strong country without economic strength would have trans-
formed India into another Soviet Union with all its negative consequences.
With social unrest in different parts of the country, economic vulnerability
accompanied by political surrender would have been catastrophic. Ironical
as it sounds, the US-led sanctions forced India to reach out to countries
that would help its economic needs and priorities. And Saudi Arabia
became a potential partner in the Middle East.
There are others who are ideologically less rigid, but concerning Islam
and energy resources, Saudi Arabia became the most crucial player, espe-
cially if India were to abandon its traditional preoccupation with Pakistan.
In 1999 both joined the new Group of 20 or G-20 as founding members.
THE SHIFT