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an economic recession from which the US had not recovered completely.
Far from being a security threat, the September 11 dealt a devastating
blow to the American economy, the raison d’être of the American pre-
eminence after Second World War.
This declining American economic power and hence political influence
manifested in the Middle East since 2001. Far from achieving any strategic
gains, the US-led invasion of Iraq which began in March 2003 plunged
the latter into a sectarian divide and endless cycle of violence. The removal
and eventual execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006 reopened
the sectarian divide latent since the formation of the Iraqi state in 1932.
The mounting American casualties and the cost of the campaign eventu-
ally forced President Bush to withdraw American military presence in that
country, a process that was completed by his successor Barrack Obama in
December 2011.
The post-2001 American policy resulted in two negative concerns in
the region. The US intervention destroyed the post–Second World War
Westphalian order in the Middle East and raised doubts about the viability
of Iraq and in the process other states in the region. As would be dis-
cussed, these concerns were heightened in the wake of the Arab Spring
protests. Moreover, the Operation Iraqi Freedom unveiled by President
Bush transformed that country as the first Shia-majority Arab state in the
political sense of the term. In the process, the US actions have embold-
ened the power and position of Iran, thereby rekindling the traditional
Arab-Persian rivalry.
While trying to pull out the US forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, the
Obama administration got itself estranged from its traditional ally Israel over
the peace process. During his eight years in office, President Obama had to
content with Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister; traditional
bonhomie between the two leaders was absent, and they disagreed and
publicly clashed over a host of issues, including the peace process and the
Iranian nuclear programme. As would be discussed, some of the Arab pow-
ers were also unhappy over Obama’s handling of Iran or the Arab Spring.
As a result, the US wielded little influence over many events in the
region or was unable to shepherd them to the benefit of its allies and
friends. On the contrary, through a policy of omissions and commissions
since 2001 various US administrations have emboldened countries which
were unfriendly or hostile towards its traditional friends. The re-entry of
Russia into the Middle Eastern affairs was partly facilitated by successive
American failures over Iran, Syria and Arab-Israeli conflict (Trenin 2018 ;
Shabaneh 2015 ).
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR