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At the same time, the political settlement did not go down well with
some of Iran’s neighbours who saw the JCOPA as a sign of a fundamental
shift in the American policy. Coming from different angles, both Israel
(Rajiv 2016 ) and Saudi Arabia (Pasha 2016 ) feel that the nuclear deal had
legitimized the advances made by Iran in the nuclear technology and in
the process had only delayed the weaponization process (Inbar 2017 ).
Obama’s reluctance to accommodate their concerns over Iranian behav-
iour and involvement in many crises in the region such as Bahrain, Iraq,
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Yemen meant that the war-weary US had
abandoned a stricter approach and in the process admitted and even facili-
tated the Iranian regional hegemony. Some of the recent low-level con-
tacts between Saudi Arabia and Israel (Heller and Kalin 2017 ) are directly
linked to their mutual concerns over the US policy towards Iran.
India seeks closer ties with all the major players of the puzzle, namely,
Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. During the decade-long controversy over
the nuclear programme, India maintained close ties with Israel while
ignoring the latter’s concerns over the Indo-Iranian ties. It continued
energy imports from Iran and initiated economic engagements, including
the development of the Chabahar Port and energy exploration (Rizvi and
Behuria 2016 ; Singh Roy 2013 ). Simultaneously, it suspended the export
of energy products to Iran, reduced oil imports from that country or opted
for rupee payment of its oil imports when pressures from the US became
unbearable (Purushothaman 2012 ; Ningthoujam 2018 ). Though Iran
was disappointed over India’s votes in the IAEA and UNSC, New Delhi
maintained the lines of communication and cooperation with Tehran.
Contrary to initial euphoria, the nuclear deal and the subsequent relax-
ation of sanctions did not bring about a fundamental change in the Indo-
Iranian equation. Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, felt let down by
the US and its reluctance to make Iran accountable for its involvement and
interference in various Arab crises from Syria in the north to Yemen in the
south. The growing Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria and its meddling in
events in Bahrain and Yemen have severely undermined the Saudi interests.
The ascendance of Prince Mohammed after his father Salman became King
in January 2015 coincided with a more assertive, aggressive and militarily
robust Saudi strategy against Tehran (Hannah 2016 ; Kanner 2017 ). A sig-
nificant reason for the Saudi-Qatari spat since June 2017 was Iran and the
perceived Qatari sympathy for the ayatollahs (AFP 2017 ; Regencia 2017 ).
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry and tension are the root cause of the sectar-
ian tension in the Middle East. The Shia-Sunni differences are as old as
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR