27The joint statement issued at the end of Nehru’s visit to the Kingdom
observed the support of both the countries for “a peaceful settlement of
the dispute relating to the Suez Maritime Canal, which is a waterway of
vital importance to their own economic well-being” and declared that
there “can be no settlement of the dispute by methods of conflict or by
denial of the sovereign rights of Egypt over the Suez Canal.. (and that) it
is possible to reach a settlement negotiated between the parties concerned
without any derogation from Egyptian sovereignty and authority and
maintaining the interests of other countries in the unrestricted use of the
canal as an open waterway” (Annexure 2 ).
At the same time, the Indo-Egyptian warmth was conspicuously absent
in the Indo-Saudi relations. The socialist and anti-colonial Nehru could
not find a common ground with the religious and conservative Saudi
monarchy. As some later-day critics argued, “while Nehru’s insistence on
nonalignment for India was understandable and justified, his political and
probably intellectual aversion to aligned nations did adversely affect India’s
relations with important Middle Eastern countries like Iran and Saudi
Arabia, which were otherwise well disposed towards India.” Nehru’s ‘dis-
tinction’ between ‘radical and conservative’ states in the Middle East was
termed “unwarranted” (Mudiam 1994 , 18). Accusing Nehru of pursuing
a “self-righteous” attitude towards the Middle East, he argued that from
the beginning the Indian leadership “entertained misgivings about Saudi
Arabia, considering it feudal and theocratic (sic) state and was wary of
cultivating it even on bilateral terms” (Mudiam 1994 , 86).
Others faulted Nehru for his apprehensions over a resurgent pan-
Islamism in the Middle East and for his failure engage more actively.
Arguing that the imperial past and the resultant nationalist and anti-
imperialist sentiments were stronger in the Arab world than religious
sentiments, they felt that it was a futile exercise on the part of Pakistan to
use Islam as a foreign policy tool to attract political support and friendship
in the Middle East (Agwani 1966 ).
The arguments were persuasive and logical. As the trajectory of
Islamic history unravels, pan-Islamism has been an elusive ideal. The
office of caliph which flourished for over 13 centuries is a Sunni Islamic
institution and for long did not enjoy the support or allegiance of the
largest component of the ummah, the Indian Muslims. The emergence
of Shia Islam in the immediate aftermath of Prophet Mohammed and
various sectarian divides in later centuries challenge the notion of
pan- Islamism. The entry of imperialism into the Islamic heartland was
THE NEHRU ERA