38
moved a step closer a few years later. On the eve of the Bangladesh War of
1971, it took a strategic step and signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty
(India, MEA 1971 ). This was seen as an insurance policy against a possible
Chinese intervention on behalf of Pakistan over Bangladesh.
The pro-Soviet tilt under Indira Gandhi also had a domestic compo-
nent. The ruling Congress Party was losing its political monopoly and lost
some of the critical states during 1967 assembly elections and this had a
cascading effect upon the national politics. Internal opposition to her
leadership was brewing and resulted in Indira Gandhi opting for social
engineering that brought her and the Congress Party closer to the Indian
left. Though socialism has been the main plank of the party since the free-
dom struggle, political compulsions forced her and the Congress Party to
be increasingly reliant on the communist parties, especially in the late
1960s. Both for support in the parliament and for political legitimacy, the
Indian leadership began to view communist parties as a progressive force.
In the external realm, this meant greater leeway for the Soviet worldview.
The Sino-Indian conflict and the emerging Sino-Soviet tension and rivalry
meant that India increasingly began viewing Moscow as its ‘natural ally’
(Ray 1988 ).
Thus, by the late 1960s, India and Saudi Arabia found themselves firmly
entrenched in opposite camps. Their differing worldviews worsened over
the Afghan crisis when the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in December
1979 which lasted for nearly a decade. Though uneasy with the action,
India eschewed open criticisms as the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan spurred Pakistan to drum up support and before long the US
and Saudi Arabia joined hands in the formation of the anti-Soviet mujahe-
deen forces which enjoyed political backing, military supplies and financial
support from the Kingdom (Hegghammer 2010 , 25). Though formally
directed at the Soviets, these efforts considerably strengthened the
Pakistani military capabilities and emboldened its anti-India rhetoric
(Riedel 2014 ).
In other words, until the end of the Cold War, there was very little
common ground between India and Saudi Arabia and each one was suspi-
cious of the other, and this was reflected in their limited political
engagements. However, a far more serious challenge came in shifts in the
geostrategic regional environment in the Middle East, which worked
against India.
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR