41crisis—supply disruption and price hike—transformed the Western,
especially European, attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and from
being sympathetic towards Israel, overnight the West European countries
turned to being pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian.
The newly found oil wealth resulted in Arab countries successfully con-
testing and eventually eliminating the prolonged claims of Jordan to speak
on behalf of the Palestinians, leading to the emergence of the PLO as the
‘sole and legitimate’ representative of the Palestinians. This was followed
by many Third World countries recognizing the PLO and its admission
into the UN as an observer in 1974. The oil crisis culminated in the Venice
Declaration of June 1980 when nine-member European Economic
Committee—which also included Britain, France and the then West
Germany—recognized the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”
leading up to “right of self-determination” with the PLO being “associ-
ated with the process” (European Economic Community 1980 ).
These two—Islamist resurgence and oil crisis—had a profound impact
upon India and its dealings with the Middle East. First and foremost, the
Arab defeat in the June War was a setback to India’s Cairo-centric
approach since 1947. The defeat led to the demise of secular pan-Arabism
and India was forced to come to terms with the new regional order led by
Riyadh. Though the World Muslim League was functioning since 1962,
the al- Aqsa fire was an impetus to Arab monarchies to reassert their posi-
tion and to capitalize on the vacuum left by Nasser’s politico-military
defeat. Both were a severe blow to India, especially when the emerging
Middle Eastern order was in sync with Pakistan and its Islam-centric
approach to international affairs.
As the Islamic conference idea was gathering momentum, New Delhi
was keen to attend. It, however, did not fulfil the two criteria of the
organizers, namely, Muslim-majority countries and Muslim head of state.
At the same time, King Faisal recognized that a procedural approach
towards India would be a disservice to the large Muslim population.
Though the actual implications became controversial later on, India was
asked to attend.
The delay in the arrival of the official delegation led by Agriculture
Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed resulted in India being represented by its
ambassador to Morocco Gurbachan Singh, a turban-wearing Sikh
diplomat, and he made a brief speech in the inaugural session. According
to Singh, “I obviously inquired whether Pakistan was part of the unani-
mous invitation. I was told that was the case” (Baruah 2002 ). There were
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