45Thus, since the mid-1960s India had to face a Middle East where
pan- Islamism replaced pan-Arabism as the dominant political force.
Secularism and Nasserism which made Cairo the prime focus of India’s
approach to the region were no longer feasible and beneficial. The support
for the Palestinians, a key component of its engagements with the region
since the early 1920s, took a more virulent form with India joining the
Arab-Islamic chorus of ‘Zionism is racism.’ As would be discussed the
uneven power situation, different worldviews, differing interests and the
Saudi preference for Pakistan meant that political conversations between
the two in the latter part of the Cold War were minimal.
LimiteD engAgements
After Nehru’s 1956 visit, high-level political contacts had to wait until
April 1981 when Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal came to India. The
timing was interesting. Though the ongoing Iran-Iraq War witnessed
some interest convergence, Faisal’s visit came amidst the Afghan crisis.
The Soviet invasion resulted in the US creating, facilitating and arming
the anti-Soviet mujahedeen forces. If Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and
later on Hosni Mubarak provided the political backing, Saudi Arabia came
up with funds (Rubin 1989 ). Before long the mountainous Afghan terri-
tory became the magnet for the Islamist fighters from different Arab
countries, who were later known as Afghan Arabs (Riedel 2014 ). After the
Soviet withdrawal, the landlocked country plunged into a civil war in
which an estimated two million were killed, maimed and several millions
were displaced (Giustozzi 2000 ).
The great game in the neighbourhood heightened India’s concerns,
especially when it resulted in a substantial increase in the US military and
security assistance to Pakistan. The Soviet presence became a pretext for
Pakistan obtaining billions of economic and military aid and assistance
from the US (Riedel 2014 ). This was also the period when Saudi Arabia
became a major benefactor for Pakistani nuclear programme, often chris-
tened as an “Islamic bomb” (Weissman and Krosney 1981 ; Shaikh 2002 ).
Though Indira Gandhi did not endorse the Soviet invasion, geopolitical
reality compelled her to be sympathetic with Moscow. Her refusal to pub-
lically criticize the Soviet action immensely strengthened Moscow’s posi-
tion internationally. Thus, as happened during the Bangladesh War, the
Afghan crisis exposed the Indo-Saudi political discord as they were back-
ing rival protagonists.
DRIFTING APART