65other monarchies were grudgingly playing a secondary role in regional
politics. Military coups and turmoil in Syria and Iraq and their cascading
effect on Arab societies at large alarmed them and contributed to what
E. H. Kerr called The Arab Cold War (Kerr 1965 ). However, the fire in
the al-Aqsa, Islam’s third holiest site in East Jerusalem, in August 1969
provided an opportune moment for the Arab monarchies to revive their
pan- Islamic agenda and this led to the first Islamic summit in September
that year and the subsequent formation of the OIC.
As discussed earlier, since independence India’s policy towards the Arab
world in general and Saudi Arabia in particular has been shaped by New
Delhi’s concerns over a possible Islamic bloc with Pakistan as the pivot.
This apprehension was not unfounded as Pakistan was able to court the
Middle Eastern countries by leveraging its Muslim identity. This strategy
brought some friends, but its efforts towards an Islamic political bloc had
to wait until the late 1960s.
For its part, India was concerned that Pakistan would become a hand-
maid of a pan-Islamic alliance and would undermine its interests in the
Middle East. This propelled India to be vociferous in its opposition to the
US-led and Pakistan-included military alliances and its unequivocal
endorsement of Nasser’s leadership as the vanguard against the Western
imperialism. As discussed in the chapter on Pakistan, New Delhi’s nervous
reaction to the first Islamic summit in Rabat in September 1969, the
unfolding Indo-Pakistan diplomatic tussle at the meeting, its eventual
‘withdrawal’ from it and the diplomatic embarrassment it faced (Noorani
1970 ; Singh 2006 ; Baruah 2002 ) highlighted India’s dilemmas over a
pan-Islamic alliance and its consequences.
As a result, the emerging pan-Islamic solidarity accompanied by overall
conservatism in the Middle East region inhibited the Indo-Saudi relations
since the late 1960s. As discussed in the next chapter, the body adopting
a pro-Pakistani position on Kashmir issue and its frequent condemnation
of India over its human rights records only made matters worse. The OIC
played into Pakistani hands and transformed Kashmir into an international
issue thereby harming the Indian interests.
Moreover, even without the Pakistani factor pan-Islamism have been
prime factors for the Kingdom vis-à-vis India and remained a main attrac-
tion until the late 1990s when India’s economic strength began to increase.
India’s large Muslim population meant that Riyadh would not be able to
ignore New Delhi and its Islamic importance. At the same time, it was
unable to wish away the Pakistani concerns and its ‘brotherly’ ties. Some
ISLAMIC DIMENSION