GOVERNMENT WITHOUT BUREAUCRACY 47the social inequality within the governing class that this implies is sometimes
referred to in the context of liturgies. For example, we hear in a rescript of
Hadrian to the city of Klazomenai in the province of Asia of embassies
classed as more important for which only the most prominent people should
be chosen ( primores viri ) rather than those of lesser eminence ( inferiores )
( Digest 50.7.5.5). Honorifi c inscriptions convey the same message, that a
small group of dominant families monopolized those offi ces and liturgies
that both were intrinsically important and brought the greater opportunities
for self- advancement. The irony is that mounting central government interest
and interference in city fi nances had the effect of accentuating differences in
wealth and status that were already present in the municipal upper class,
and reduced the capacity of the class as a whole to fulfi l its liturgical
obligations.
Emperor, governor, cities
The task of extracting the surplus resources of the provinces was handled by
the cities. But could the cities be relied on to collect the taxes and fulfi l their
other obligations, and was a monarchical government likely to take this on
trust? It might be supposed that a central administration of the kind that we
have described, centrally organized and controlled, and ready to contemplate
modest expansion and diversifi cation where crucial needs were served not at
all or only ineffi ciently, was likely to take a more active interest than its
Republican predecessor had done in local administration and in particular
in the tax- collecting operation.
The appearance from the late fi rst century of city curators, centrally
appointed from the senatorial or equestrian order or the local elite, has
already been noted. Their sphere was primarily fi nancial administration,
and their typical tasks were control of investment of city funds, management
of city lands, enforcement of the payment of debts owed to the city or of
pledges of fi nancial expenditure made ( Digest 22.1.33; 50.10.5 etc.). The
sources rarely show us curators in action, we know little of their doings, and
they are likely to have been employed only to a limited extent in our period.
Their emergence is nevertheless a sign of central government concern over
the state of municipal fi nance.
But other evidence suggests that the emperor and his advisers manifested
this concern not by multiplying the offi cials who were active in the provinces,
but by supervising more closely those who were already there. This means,
in the fi rst place, the provincial governor, and secondly, local government
offi cials themselves.
Governors with consular or praetorian rank possessed imperium. A
holder of imperium by tradition had the power to command an army and
full jurisdictional authority. But the concept was ill- defi ned, and this was not
unintended. The Romans were inclined to give their high offi cials wide