3.3.3 LU §a3 (/29) provides that a witness who testifies but then
refuses to take the oath must pay the compensation at issue in the
case. Court records do note failure to take the oath but not the con-
sequences (NG 113:47–55, 209), except in the case of a wife who
refuses to take the oath and then confesses to adultery. She is divorced
(NG 205:18–26).^543.3.4 Tablets could be presented in evidence of transactions, but
their limitations were recognized, and the witnesses to the transac-
tions were preferred (e.g., NG 45).^55 A tablet was accepted as evi-
dence of manumission by an owner now dead (NG 205:27–42) and
of sale but not of actual payment (NG 105). The oath could over-
ride the evidence of sealed tablets (NG 208:11–21; cf. NG 205:43–59).
LU 11, however, requires that a widow who claims to have (re)mar-
ried produce a tablet of the marriage contract.3.3.5 Remarkably, the di-til-la records themselves do not seem to
have been used as evidence of the court’s decision in later litigation
on the same matter. Instead, the ma“kim was called upon to give
oral evidence, and if necessary to take the oath (e.g., NG 106; cf.
41, 89). A further set of institutional witnesses present at the deci-
sion are the marza, whose function is not clear.^56 The tablet may
also record the presence of interested parties, so as to bar them from
challenging the decision at a later date. Witnesses were also present
at the taking of the oath in the temple, including a not otherwise
attested “judge of the temple of Nanna” (NG 123).3.3.6 Although well known from earlier periods, the ordeal does
not appear in the court records. LU 13 and 14, however, mention
the river ordeal in connection with accusations of witchcraft and
adultery. Furthermore, frequent recourse to the ordeal is attested by
the many administrative texts recording persons going to the river(^54) Following Lafont (S.), Femmes, Droit et Justice.. ., 268. Contra Falkenstein ad
loc., who interpreted this text as the husband refusing to take the oath. But the
oath can only be as to personal knowledge; the husband would not have personal
knowledge of the wife’s adultery unless he had caught her in flagrante delicto, in
which case an oath would hardly be necessary.
(^55) See also Oh’e, “Lú-inim-ma...”
(^56) See Falkenstein, GerichtsurkundenI.. ., 54–58.
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