Khaldunist Philosophy: Innovation Justified 317
Na’ima’s answer is that kings may well have trusted people to supervise their
administrators, so long as the latter do not harm the state; but this does not
mean that the former may take over these affairs completely. The ulema’s task
is to guide the administrators (vükela) to the right path, not to impose their
own interests; it is the grand vizier’s duty, having the highest post of all those
granted by the sultan, to administer all the affairs pertaining to the well-being
of the subjects, the treasury, the army, etc., of the realm. Whenever any other
official or companion of the sultan interferes with the grand vizier’s work and
is able to annul his decisions, state affairs no longer follow the natural order
(nizam-ı tabi’i) and rebellion may be close at hand. Moreover, such a person
may amass the properties and the services of a large number of people and
so overwhelm the power of the grand vizier, the absolute proxy of the sultan;
his rise and power may become so great that he will be considered to have
the equivalent of the sultan’s power (cenab-ı saltanata müşareket haline varsa
gerektir). Inevitably, concludes Na’ima, this will lead to fear, hatred, and his
ultimate destruction. Moreover, he adds, administration and politics require
“recourse to stratagems and intrigue”; these behaviors, however, are unfit for
the dignity of the ulema, and so it would be better if they stayed away from
state affairs as much as possible.
Na’ima then continues by narrating the Edirne revolt, before reaching his
conclusion (N VI App: 43–52; Ip IV:1883–87). He remarks once more that, in
these (i.e. his own) days, when the Ottoman state has reached its fourth or
even fifth stage, the number of salaried people and the scale of state expendi-
ture have increased to such a degree that covering them is almost impossible.
In such circumstances, argues Na’ima, it is very difficult for a king to stay in
the capital (darü’l-mülk) and impose reforms; instead, he should instead go
somewhere else, using some excuse (such as hunting, war preparations, or just
a visit), and try to amend things from there. From such a place, Na’ima ex-
plains, it is easier to amass money in the treasury by taking secret measures to
reduce expenditure and increase income, since if he does so from the capital
the people are bound to revolt. This happens because the people of the capi-
tal are, by nature, settled (hazariyyet rüsuh bulmuştur) and are used to profit-
ing from the state and living off its money. As such, they keep a close eye on
palace activity and tend to circulate news about the palace and the dynasty,
whether for good or bad; in consequence, merchants might raise their prices
or ask to be paid accordingly. Only from a distance and in secret is it possible
to take such measures, just as merchants use “legal stratagems” (hiyel-i şer’iyye)
to increase their property. In the same way, a man whose financial situation
is in dire straits should find an excuse to leave his house temporarily so he
can fix his finances gradually, away from the pressure of his family and his
debtors, who will give him a period of grace by necessity. The “human society”