320 chapter 7
tolls from Muslim merchants (gümrük namına alınan zekat), has to be distrib-
uted to the poor and needy, as well as to the clerks of the treasury (beytülmal
hizmetinde olan). Land taxes, the poll-tax, tolls from infidel merchants, and
money extracted from infidel rulers in exchange for peace (i.e. the largest part
of state income) must be devoted to maintaining the army, paying the salaries
of the ulema, and constructing castles and mosques, and so on. Such a catego-
rization is nothing new; in fact, it is less completed or detailed compared to
Dede Cöngi’s mid-sixteenth-century treatise (see above, chapter 3), but Na’ima
again has some notes on the situation in his own time. He remarks that this
division has altered with the passing of time and changing conditions; for in-
stance, most of the ulema take their salaries from the income of their own
posts so that they now represent no burden for the state budget (taraf-ı miri),
while most other offices are paid through customs income.
Another piece of economic-cum-political thought can be found following
the description of the death of Derviş Mehmed Pasha (1655) and the huge
wealth he had amassed through various entrepreneurial activities, including
commercial husbandry and the exploitation of bakeries.78 Na’ima first quotes
the pasha as saying that there are three natural ways of making a living (agri-
culture, commerce, and leadership [i.e. income from the ruler]), while others
have also added craftsmanship. This formulation (it may be originally attrib-
uted to the pasha or to Na’ima himself ) departs from Ibn Khaldun’s similar
expression, which was, as noted above (chapter 2), repeated by Kınalızade.79
However, unlike his mentor, Na’ima accepts leadership as being a natural
source of revenue, but thinks that craftsmanship can, in fact, be reduced to
commerce, as the income of most craftsmen barely suffices for their living and
therefore they have no real revenue. On the other hand, magnates and officials
benefit from the merchants and the peasants, because the latter do not ask for
immediate payment, thinking of their future prospects, while also conceding
part of their profits out of fear. That is how the notables and magnates take for
themselves about a quarter of the efforts of the people and consequently get
rich quickly. Derviş Mehmed Pasha allegedly argued that, whenever adminis-
trators cannot increase their income and property by commerce or agriculture,
they tend to commit two great sins: first, they steal the money and property of
the people, thus becoming tyrants; and secondly, they are incapable of stor-
ing even this wealth, stolen from the people, since they spend it on luxury
goods they consider indispensable; as such, they fall into the hands of usurers
78 Na ’ima 1864–1866, 6:26–28; Na ’ima – İpşirli 2007, 4:1571–1572. Cf. Kunt 1977; Faroqhi 1994,
547–549. On Ibn Khaldun’s formulation see Ibn Khaldun – Rosenthal 1958, 2:315ff.
79 See the detailed analysis in Kunt 1977, 206–211, and cf. Ermiş 2014, 97–102.