340 chapter 8
appears to understand justice more as equal treatment (the vizier “must treat
all and everyone in an equal way”: U11, W66) rather than as protection of the
peasants. He does, however, stress that any new taxes should not be imposed
on peasants, as excessive taxation is like taking earth from the foundations of
a house in order to build its roof. Nahifi is slightly more interested in the fate
of peasants: he suggests that special salaried agents should report regularly on
the affairs of the provinces, informing the vizier which places have been ruined
because of excessive taxation or oppression, and that harsh measures should
be taken against highway robbers, among others. According to Nahifi, special
attention must be paid to “bad innovations” (I23: muhdesat-ı zulmiye ve bid’at-ı
seyyi’e), i.e. illegal taxes and dues imposed on the peasants without being re-
corded in the registers. Defterdar, on the other hand, devotes much more of his
chapter on the need to keep peasants in their place. Faithfully copying Lütfi
Pasha, he stresses that peasant families should not be allowed to follow when
one peasant is granted a timar or when he starts to follow a career in the ulema.
Whenever a peasant flees from his land in order to escape oppression, the gov-
ernor of the area to which he has fled should send him back and resettle him
there according to the old law (U97, W119: kanun-ı kadim üzre).
What seems to radically differentiate Defterdar’s advice from earlier “mir-
rors for princes” (bringing him closer to Kâtib Çelebi and Na’ima) is his attitude
towards the janissaries. He states, as does practically every other author, that
the janissary army must be small in size but always ready for battle. He uses
his own personal experience to describe how bonuses were paid in 1703 (U79,
W103–104); what is striking here is that he writes nothing about decreasing
the numbers or salaries of the janissaries. Instead, money should be found to
pay them their current salary. Moreover, in his chapter devoted to the janis-
sary corps (U85–91, W110–115), which he considers the most important issue
for the empire, he proceeds to give similarly cautious advice. Obviously bear-
ing in mind the recent 1703 revolt (but also reflecting older advice, e.g. that
of Kâtib Çelebi), Defterdar hastens to note that reforms in this matter should
be made slowly and in close consultation with the officer corps. As did many
previous theorists, Defterdar also notes the intrusion of many strangers into
the janissary ranks (U87, W112); as such the pay-rolls must be checked, though
such should be done in close collaboration with the corps’ officers. The same
caution against harsh interference should, perhaps, be seen in Nahifi’s advice
to the grand vizier not to investigate the concealed faults of the people (I19:
halkın uyub-ı hafiyyesin teftîş eylemeyeler; however, this advice, strongly remi-
niscent of Kâtib Çelebi, is not found in Defterdar). Finally, in Defterdar’s long
and detailed discussion of military practicalities (U101–121, W121–132; Nahifi
has an almost identical discussion) that inaugurated a long tradition that was