A History of Ottoman Political Thought Up to the Early Nineteenth Century

(Ben Green) #1

368 chapter 8


accuses every speaker of hypocrisy, as they all blame each other and ignore
their own sins; when he is reminded of the glorious sultans of old (and espe-
cially Selim I), he answers that the people of old also avoided luxury and pomp,
esteemed knowledge, and were displeased whenever peace was concluded
with the infidel. If such things change, the Ottoman state may replenish “as
is written in the conclusion of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddima” (Ş192–193). Finally,
after refuting the Sufi who was present in terms that resemble Birgivi’s accusa-
tions (cult of the saints, dancing: Ş217ff.),70 Hidayet Çelebi argues once more
that the state would be restored if everyone reverts to the ancient zeal and
piety, before finally revealing his identity as the author of the treatise (Ş241).
Thus, Abdullah Halim Efendi ends his work by launching traditional attacks
on corruption, ignorance, and moral decay (smokers and divinators are again
among the main targets), while at the same time defending the sultan and his
viziers, as he places final responsibility on the conscience of all Muslims. It is
interesting to observe his use of the old dictum that things change from time
to time not to advocate innovation but instead to show the difference between
the zealous Muslims of old and corrupt contemporaries.


...


In the works of all the authors examined above (and perhaps most of all in
Abdullah Halim Efendi’s), one may discern a shift toward a more individualis-
tic interpretation of history. In the words of Virginia Aksan,71


By pointing to the efficacy of rationalizing warfare, [Ottoman bureau-
crats] were suggesting that the outcome of war could be influenced by
man, though divine intervention remained the deciding factor. The ideol-
ogy of the “ever-victorious-frontier” and “the circle of equity” was slowly
being replaced with that of service to din-ü-devlet on the part of each
individual ... [A]rguments in the Ottoman-Islamic context for the le-
gitimacy of peace amongst equals, fixed and defensible boundaries, and
European style discipline and training, by calling on one’s duty to din-ü-
devlet, may have been persuasive and could explain in part the apparent
willingness of some of the ulema to accept fundamental changes to the
traditional order.

70 In this vein the author rejects Kâtib Çelebi on the grounds that “he is not one of the older
ulema, of the best of the posterior ones, or even of those given priority” (Ş221: ulemâ-i
mukaddimînden, fühûl-ı muteahhirînden ve ashâb-ı tercîhden hiç birinden değildir).
71 Aksan 1993, 63–64 (=Aksan 2004, 43–44); cf. Şakul 2005, 120.

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