The Eighteenth Century: the Westernizers 407
continuation of settled life (temadi-i hazar), we have forgotten the arts of
war and consequently we have not had a single victory for five years now.Furthermore, he notes, constant war has damaged the treasury, while the in-
ternational situation is not favorable either. After carefully blaming (the dead)
Mustafa III’s avarice (buhl) and his counselors’ simple-mindedness, he con-
cludes that peace would be acceptable and fit for the current needs of the state.
However, the Ottomans also need to find another ally as a mediator in order
to benefit from the balance of power among the European states. The author
examines three potential candidates (France, England, and the Netherlands),
analyzing the intentions and power of each in detail.52 At any rate, he con-
cludes, the Ottomans need to gain the attention of one of these three states
in order to use it as negotiator; to this end, permanent ambassadors should be
appointed to the European capitals. As if to refute himself and to comply with
more traditional advice, the author ends his essay by stressing the need for
statesmen to be pious, well-meaning, honest, and united.
While analyzing the relationship with France, the author remarks that
a French “nobleman” (beğzade: meaning Baron de Tott) was sent to train
Ottoman soldiers. Then, he reverts to the argument of Muslim precedence, as
did Müteferrika and the contemporaneous Su’âl-i Osmânî: Westerners always
knew that the advantage of the Ottomans laid in their zeal for martyrdom and
that is why they chose to intensify the training and drilling of their own armies
in order to match this religious fervor. It is somewhat odd that Ottomans now
have to revert to European methods of training and, besides, the author finds
that there is a tendency to consider every inexperienced and young European
adventurer as an experienced officer to whom Ottoman veterans should bow
(Y15–16).
52 France, apart from being an old friend of the Ottoman Empire, needs good relations with
it because of trade. The increased French trade, however, is not self-evidently profitable
for the Ottomans: no matter how inexperienced they are, the author explains, Ottoman
Black Sea merchants leave their profits to the land (memleketimizde), except when they
are useful to the navy. The French merchants, in contrast, will co-operate with them
only to decrease their capacity and profits, like they also do in the Aegean Sea (Y13–14).
England is a strong state, possessing territories in India and in America, and also has the
advantage of being commercially necessary to the northern countries, thus being able to
manipulate them. The author argues that if the Ottomans open the Black Sea to Russia,
the English merchants will lose out (to the French). Finally, Netherlands is not so strong
a nation as the other two, but it is very active in the maritime trade; on the other hand,
the Dutch have financially supported Russia and so have to be considered a second-rate
potential ally.